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Housing Partnerships: Shelters from
Taxes and Shelters for People
Leon Gabinet and Ronald I. Coffey
Why should an investor put his money in low and moderate income
housing when he can realize a greater net profit return from other invest-
ments?
I. INTRODUCTION
HE FOREGOING QUERY frames the basic issue which is the
subject of this article. Those whose wealth is sought for the
construction and rehabilitation of low and moderate income housing
answer plaintively: Net income yield from such projects is simply
not sufficient. Nor are the com-
plaints about inadequate yieldTH-E AUTHORs: [LEON GABINET (Ph.B., heard only from exploiters.
J.D., University of Chicago) is an As-
sociate Professor of Law at Case Western Indeed, the more beneficent
Reserve University and is admitted to the the landlord, the less likely his
Oregon and Federal Bars and the Tax
Court of the United States. His teaching chances of eking out a reason-
specialty is Federal Taxation. RONALD able net return. High costs of
J. COFFEY (A.B., Xavier University;
LL.B., University of Cincinnati; u..M., construction materials and la-
Harvard University) is an Associate Pro- bor, frequent tenant turnover,
fessor of Law at Case Western Reserve and other expenses peculiar to
University and is admitted to the Ohio
and Federal Bars. His teaching special- the operation of inner-city
ties are Corporations, Securities Regula- housing conspire to shrivel the
tion, and Business Planning. margin available to the con-
scientious landlord. Small
wonder, then, that many socially sensitive investors shrink from the
prospect of substantial financial commitment to such troubled rental
property.' Arguments that investors should be satisfied with "social
return" in lieu of monetary yield have not yet carried the day, al-
though some foundations have instituted the practice of investing a
portion of principal in "program related" projects, knowing full well
that they will suffer a reduction of income.2 It -is conceivable that
the constant stream of solicitations for gifts to social programs will,
in time, make industry and others more favorably disposed toward in-
1 See Note, Government Programs to Encourage Private Investment in Low-Income
Housing, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1295-96 (1968).
2 See FORD FOUNDATION, NEw OPTIONS IN THE PHILANTHROPIC PROCESS
(1968).
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vestment, albeit risky, as an alternative to continuous giving. No
such shift in thinking on any significant scale appears to be immi-
nent, however, and the day when investing in low and moderate in-
come housing might become popular as a sort of sublimated gift-
giving seems fairly remote.8
Faced with the inevitable low-yield phenomenon, concerned pro-
fessionals and legislators have sought to devise techniques for en-
ticing capital into the fundamentally unattractive field of low and
moderate income housing. Except for those schemes aimed primarily
at reducing construction costs through radically new design and pro-
duction techniques, the contrivances for stimulating private invest-
ment have amounted to nothing more than subsidies, direct or indi-
rect. One indirect method of increasing yield on rental real estate
through government participation is the accelerated depreciation "tax
shelter," a practice not at all unfamiliar to tax counsel. It is not the
purpose of this article to assess the relative merits of subsidy variants.
While the writers tend to agree with those who see significant dan-
gers in using the tax structure as an incentive for social action,4 a re-
alistic approach demands recognition of the fact that many potential
investors find the tax saving approach more palatable than straight-
forward grants by government.5
Assuming, arguendo, that tax incentives represent appropriate de-
vices for fostering socially desirable behavior, the question arises
whether tax shelters, particularly those based on accelerated depre-
ciation, are suited to the attainment of standardized housing. To be
sure, the tax shelter approach -is an "on the shelf" item which is fa-
miliar to many because of its more than insubstantial use in
untroubled areas of real estate investment.6 Moreover, the legisla-
3 Indeed, it is not unusual to hear donors advance the argument that a deductible con-
tribution is superior to a marginal investment because, upon the making of a gift, an
amount equal to tax reduction is maintained in cash flow where it can quickly earn back
the net cost of the donation.
4 See Note, supra note 1, at 1309-18. For a criticism by former Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury Stanley S. Surrey of accelerated methods of depredation on the basis of
loss of government revenues and promotion of slum conditions, see Wall Street J., Oct.
29, 1968, at 7, col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
5 Demaree, What Business Wants from President Nixon, FORTUNE, Feb., 1969, at
87. Perhaps this attitude is a function of the fact that many men of wealth have so con-
sistently deprecated direct government grants in other contexts that they are now wedded
to an unalterable antagonism toward all kinds of open and straightforward government
participation.
6The real estate depreciation shelter has been devoted to the attainment of specific
social goals by the Mutual Real Estate Investment Trust, whose primary aim is to pur-
chase rental property for the purpose of establishing integrated communities of apart-
ment dwellers. Prospectus, Mutual Real Estate Investment Trust, March 4, 1968, at 3.
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tive history of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968,'
mirabile dictu, contains a Congressional exhortation to utilize tax
shelters for the production of low and moderate income housing."
On the other hand, it has been forcefully argued that accelerated
depreciation allowances actually hasten deterioration, because repairs
tend to lengthen useful lives (thereby diminishing yearly deduc-
tions) and because fast write-offs encourage rotation of property as
soon as depreciation no longer adequately shelters income.9 Consid-
ering the legitimate and substantial points which can be marshalled
against -the utilization of tax shelters in connection with low and
moderate income housing, one might legitimately question the wis-
dom of Congress' taking the contrary tack of encouraging the use of
depreciation write-offs as a stimulus to investment. The answer
may lie in the protections and controls contained in federal housing
legislation which Congress created as the ancillary means of maximi-
zing the benefits of what is basically a tax incentive device.10
It has also been suggested that the Commissioner's arsenal of
anti-tax-avoidance weapons might be deployed against tax shelter in-
vestments because they are generally accompanied by a fairly intense
purpose to finesse taxes." However, where the tax shelter is a con-
7 82 Star. 476, printed in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 547.
8 S. Rep. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26, 85 (1968). But see note 108 infra.
9 Sporn, Some Contributions of the Income Tax Law to the Growth and Prevalence
of Slums, 59 COLUM. L REv. 1026, 1037-38 (1959).
10 National Housing Act sections 221(d)(3), 12 U.S.CA. § 17151(d)(3) (1969), and
236(j)(3), 12 U.S.C.A § 1715z-l(j)(3) (1969), provide for 90 percent mortgage insur-
ance for certain limited distribution entities (limited dividend mortgagors or sponsors)
engaged in rehabilitation and operation of rental properties. Financing at 3 percent in-
terest is available after final endorsement of a mortgage by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA). National Housing Act § 221(d) (4), 12 U.S.C.A. § 17151(d) (4)
(1969); 24 C.F.R. § 221.518(b) (1969). Section 23 6 (c) of the National Housing
Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1 (c) (1969), provides for subsidies payable to the mortgagee
of a limited distribution mortagor in an amount not exceeding the difference between the
debt service required under market interest financing and the debt service under 1 percent
interest financing. Rent supplement payments are available to tenants of 221 (d) (3)
and 236(j) (3) projects conducted by limited distribution mortgagors. 24 C.F.R. § 5.15
(1969). Finally, section 236(j)(3) makes it possible for nonprofit housing sponsors or
cooperatives to obtain 100 percent loans at 1 percent interest for the purpose of pur-
chasing property at fair market value (subject to certain limitations) from limited dis-
tribution mortgagors. It will later appear how these opportunities serve to enhance
the tax shelter potential of rental real estate operations. See text accompanying notes
85-124 infra. At the same time, federal mortgage insurance programs are supervised
by the FHA which can specify standards of construction, rehabilitation, and operation
to be met by profit-making sponsors seeking federally-backed financing. Moreover,
the technique of selling real estate to a "take oue' nonprofit sponsor or cooperative may
halt the turnover syndrome, which some have claimed is exacerbated by depreciation tax
shelters.
"lYoung, The Role of Motive in Evaluating Tax Sheltered Investment, 22 TAx
LAWYER 275 (1968).
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comitant of investment in low and moderate income housing, it
would seem that taxpayers could fend off Revenue Service attack by
raising the tough shield of overwhelming social purpose and virtue.
After all, the legislative history of the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 196812 does expressly encourage the partnership form of
business as a vehicle for augmenting general accounting net income
with tax shelter return . 8  Moreover, Title IX of the same Act au-
thorizes the establishment of the so-called National Housing Part-
nership,14 whose structure is so clearly meant to facilitate tax shelter-
ing that Congressional blessing on such devices cannot be denied. 5
II. THE TAX SHELTER IN THE PRODUCTION
OF Low AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSING
A. Depreciation Tax Shelters Generally.
The basic tax incentive in rental real estate investment is the pos-
sibility of achieving a so-called "tax shelter" for high bracket taxpay-
ers whereby tax depreciation deductions are used to offset high
bracket income.' 6 Such a state of affairs can best be achieved by a
proper combination of high tax depreciation deductions in relation to
a low rate of amortization of a large mortgage. This optimum com-
bination is possible where investment basis is attributable to post 1953
new construction or where -the investor acquires depreciable property
after 1953 and is the first user. In such circumstances, fast deprecia-
tion methods, such as double declining balance or sum of the years
digits, may be used..7  The availability of accelerated tax deprecia-
tion makes it possible for the investor to offset the rental income
12 82 Star. 476, printed in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 547.
3 '"The partnership arrangement makes it possible to assure an adequate return to
investors. Under existing Internal Revenue Service regulations and rulings, partner-
ship losses for tax purposes flow to the individual partners. In the case of new housing
units financed on a 10 percent equity - 90 percent debt basis, the annual accelerated
depreciation of the building cost results in substantial book losses during the initial 10
years after the project is built. Assuming the member of the partnership is in relatively
(sic) high income tax bracket, his share of depreciation losses, plus cash income from
project operations would provide an after-tax return on his investment which would
compare favorably with the return which most industrial firms realize on their equity
capital." S. Rep. No. 1123, supra note 8, at 85.
14 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 §§ 901-11, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3931-
3940, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (1969).
5 See discussion accompanying notes 109-16 infra.
'
6 See, e.g., Asch, Tax Considerations in Real Estate Syndications, 3 VILL. L. REV.
469 (1958); Boughner, How the Tax-wise Investor Buys Real Estate Today, 9 J. TAXA-
TION 30 (1958); Graves, Depreciation for Tax Purposes, 34 TAxES 59, 60 (1956).
17 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(b), 167(c), [hereinafter cited as CODE].
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from -the property with a portion of the depreciation deduction and
to use the operating loss produced by the remaining depreciation to
offset his income from other sources.
The attractiveness of the shelter is increased by the fact that the
basis for depreciation includes not only -the investor's own cash out-
lay, but the mortgage indebtedness as well.18 Since a real estate in-
vestment is rarely accomplished without mortgage financing, it is
readily apparent that the investor is securing the additional advan-
tage of depreciation deductions based on a -total sum which may be
far in excess of his own cash investment. Consequently, while in-
come is being offset generously on the tax side by rapid tax depre-
ciation write-offs, rental revenue may be producing tax free book net
income because a lower rate of depreciation is being used for general
accounting purposes.
A simple example will illustrate the advantages of using acceler-
ated depreciation. Suppose T constructs an apartment building for
$40,000, $30,000 of which was borrowed. Based on a useful life of
forty years for the building and using straight line depreciation (2.5
percent or $1,000), T's taxable income and pretax book net income
from the building (after straight line depreciation) amount to
$800. Amortization of loan principal is $500. Assuming that tax-
able income from the building is taxed at a 50 percent bracket rate,
the following analysis results:
Tax
Taxable income after straight line depreciation --------- 800
Tax @ 50%- ------------------------------------ 400
After-Tax Income Yield
Book net income after straight line depreciation -------- 800
Less: taxes ----------------------------------- 400
After-tax income yield --------------------------- 400
Percentage of equity investment -------------------- 4%
Fund Flow
Book net income ---------------------------- 800
Add back: book depreciation --------------------- 1000
1800
Less: amortization --------------------------- 500
Fund flow ----------------------------------- 1300
Two points should be noted at this juncture. First, although book
net income is $800, fund flow is $1300 because book depreciation ex-
18 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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ceeds amortization. Thus, $1300 could be distributed: $800 net in-
come and $500 amounting to return of capital for general account-
ing purposes. Since tax depreciation exceeds amortization by $500,
that amount of distributable fund flow is sheltered from taxation,
but the $800 of book net income is not so sheltered.
If T were to employ double declining balance (twice straight line
percentage) depreciation for tax purposes, the analysis of his apart-
ment rental operation would be as follows:
Tax
Taxable income after straight line depreciation --------- 800
Less: additional depreciation deduction under 200%
declining balance ---------------------------- 1000
Taxable income (net tax loss) after 200%
declining balance ---------------------------- (200)
Tax ----------------------------------------- 0-
Tax Shelter Saving
Net tax loss from apartment taken against other income
of T @ 50%; tax saving ----------------------- 100
Percent of equity investment ---------------------- 1%
After-Tax Income Yield
Pretax net after straight line depredation ------------- 800
Less: taxes ------------------------------------ 0-
800
Percentage of equity investment -------------------- 8%
Fund Flow
Book net income ------------------------------- 800
Add back: book depreciation --------------------- 1000
1800
Less: amortization ------------------------------ 500
Fund flow ----------------------------------- 1300
By switching to accelerated depreciation, T has increased the ef-
fective yield on his equity investment to 9 percent, comprised of 8
percent tax-free book net income and a 1 percent tax shelter saving
on income from other sources. Tax depreciation was increased to ex-
ceed amortization by $1500, thus creating a shelter for $1300 of
distributable fund flow (including $800 book net income) as well
as $200 of T's other income. 19
19 All this is frequently explained by the generalization that a tax shelter is created
when tax depreciation exceeds amortization. Such a proposition should be handled
with care, however. The shelter notion involves a mixture of fund flow and net in-
come concepts. The starting point of the analysis is book net income, that is, net in-
come after book depreciation. Fund flow is computed by adding to net income the
non-cash deduction of book depreciation and by subtracting debt principal amortization
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The shelter is also rendered more attractive by the further possi-
bility of toying with the useful lives of assets and with allocation of
cost between depreciable structures and nondepreciable land.20  The
investor is usually very pessimistic about useful life - a view which
encourages him to depreciate the asset more quickly and thus accen-
tuate the shelter possibilities which inhere in depreciation. The same
effect is procured by adopting a more cheerful view as to the relation
of the value of depreciable structures to nondepreciable land. Both
attitudes will result in "overdepreciating" the property which lowers
his after-tax investment and maximizes his profit potential.
It would be unfair to paint so cheerful a picture of the tax shelter
possibilities of a rental real estate investment without noting some
disquieting elements on the scene. First, if the actual rate of wear
and tear equals or exceeds available depreciation deductions, then the
cash flow resulting from the deduction is completely illusory. In
those circumstances, the deduction merely replaces the asset. Second,
there is an inescapable correlation between the rate of depreciation
and mortgage amortization. If accelerated depreciation is used, then
in later years, when the depreciation deductions are significantly re-
duced, the rate of mortgage amortization will begin to outstrip the
effects of depredation deductions. At this point, of course, the in-
vestment begins to lose its appeal as a shelter and the investor will
payments. Fund flow represents the cash-type assets generated by an operation cyde.
Two major observations should be made about fund flow: First, it can be greater or
less than net income, depending on whether amortization is larger or smaller than
book depredation. Second, fund flow represents the amount which can be practically
distributed to the partidpants of an enterprise, though it must be noted that, where dis-
tributions are made out of fund flow in excess of net income, such distributions repre-
sent xeturn of capital. Similarly, where net income exceeds fund flow, all of net in-
come cannot be readily distributed.
In a situation where fund flow is less than net income because book depredation
is less than amortization, any current distributions will of necessity be out of net in-
come. Under these conditions, if tax depredation outstrips book depredation, net in-
come will be sheltered from tax. However, unless tax depreciation exceeds amortization
also, no portion of distributable net income will be sheltered.
On the other hand, where fund flow is greater than net income because book de-
predation is larger than amortization (which is the case in the text example accom-
panying this footnote), income is readily distributable. Normally, a distribution of the
excess of fund flow over net income would be considered return of capital for general
accounting purposes. However, unless tax depredation exceeds amortization, no por-
don of distributable fund flow will escape taxation - not even that amount which, if
distributed, would represent return of capital according to non-tax accounting. And,
where fund flow exceeds net income, the latter will not be sheltered from taxation except
to the extent that tax depredation is greater than book depredation.
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (1960) requires allocation of purchase price between
depreciable and nondepreciable property, since depredation basis may not exceed that
portion of a lump sum purchase price which represents the value of the depreciable
property.
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generally sell the property. If sold for an amount in excess of the
tax basis, there will be a capital gains tax to pay if the property was
held for investment, and there is also the possibility of depreciation
recapture under section 125021 of the Internal Revenue Code. More-
over, since the property is no longer new, a prospective buyer will not
be entitled to accelerated depreciation and marketing problems may
develop.22
In general, however, the foregoing illustrates that an investor
who is able to combine the necessary ingredients of accelerated de-
preciation and a relatively low rate of mortgage amortization can,
indeed, achieve distributable but nontaxable net income from his in-
vestment as well as a tax shelter for other income. At the very least,
he will be able to shelter the income from the investment itself and
thus achieve the object of securing more spendable cash. It is small
wonder, therefore, that the terms "tax shelter" and "tax sheltered in-
vestment" have found their way into common parlance among the in-
vesting public.
B. Possible Business Forvns for Utilizing the Tax Shelter.
The foregoing discussion of real estate tax shelters has been
framed in terms of an individual investor acting alone and on his
own behalf. The growth of large real estate developments, how-
ever, both residential and commercial, coupled with the financial, le-
gal and other intricacies of large projects, has led to a concomitant
search for proper legal entities wherein a number of investors may
join to pool their resources and jointly reap the profits. Some devel-
opers and investors find the corporation well suited to their needs.
Others have turned to trusts, partnerships, limited partnerships, syn-
dicates of one sort or another, and, more recently, to formal Real Es-
tate Investment Trusts (REIT) governed by specific Code provi-
sions 3
In recent years, the use of the corporate form has been limited to
the construction segment of the real estate business, where limited
liability and the continuing active nature of the enterprise render
this form useful. It is not particularly useful to the investment seg-
ment of the business because, by the interposition of an independent
tax-paying entity, the pass-through of depreciation deductions to the
21 CODE §§ 1231, 1250. See discussion accompanying notes 108 and 121-24 infra.
22 CODE § 167(c). See note 108 infra.
23 See Kelley, Real Estate Investment Trusts After Seven Years, 23 Bus. LAw. 1001
(1968).
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individual investor cannot be accomplished. 24  The corporation can,
of course, make use of accelerated depreciation to reduce its own tax-
able income and earnings and profits, so as to render distributions to
shareholders nontaxable to the extent of basis in the shares.2 5 How-
ever, to the extent that the corporation's depreciation deductions ex-
ceed its income and cannot be used by way of a carryover loss deduc-
tion, they are wasted. Even if a net operating loss generated by
excess tax depredation could be used to reduce the corporation's
taxable income in another year, the loss could not be used to reduce
earnings and profits of such other year. 8 Furthermore, the Code
specifically provides that distributions to shareholders will receive
dividend treatment notwithstanding a deficit of earnings and profits
from prior years if there are current earnings and profits2 T Thus,
excess tax depreciation from one year may not be available to
render distributions of another year nontaxable to shareholders.
Because of the problems inherent in the use of corporations, real
estate investors, banded together in syndicates, have generally sought
some other business form as their investment vehicle. By avoiding
the corporate form, they manage to secure the pass-through of depre-
dation which, as we -have seen, is the key to the real estate invest-
ment. However, by the same token, they give up limited liability,
centralized management, continuity of life, and easy transferability
of interests in the enterprise, all of which are -inherent in the corpor-
ate form. Thus, the story of real estate syndication is basically a
search for an investment vehicle which combines these nontax cor-
porate advantages with the tax advantages of a noncorporate busi-
ness entity.28  The alternatives are fairly limited and the choice is
generally narrowed to the following: a common law trust, a lim-
ited partnership, and (more recently) a REIT.
In choosing an investment vehicle which has noncorporate tax at-
tributes and nontax advantages of a corporation, the real estate in-
24 See Silverman, Modern Techniques of Acquiring and Owning Property: The
Real Estate Syndicate, N.Y.U. 18TI INST. ON FED. TAX. 1 (1960).
25 CODE §§ 301 (c), 316(a). But see Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 452, H.R. 13270,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 270-71 (1969) (only straight line depredation can be used to
calculate earnings and profits).
26Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(d) (1960).
2 7 CODE § 316(a) (2). Of course, an earnings and profits deficit can be set off
against undistributed earnings and profits of a later year.
28 See, e.g., Aronsohn, Syndicates, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 637 (1958);
Casey, How to Determine Best Form of Real Estate Syndicate to Preserve Tax Advan-
tages, 7 J. TAXATION 328 (1957); Linden, Use of Partnerships for Rental Real Estate,
N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAX. 1015 (1963).
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 723
vestment syndicate often finds itself confronted with the provisions
of section 7701 (a) (3) of the Code. In general, this section provides
that the term "corporation" includes a number of business forms
such as "associations, joint stock companies, and insurance compan-
ies." For tax purposes, therefore, an association is treated as a cor-
poration. Unfortunately, the term "association" is not defined either
in the Code or the Regulations. However, the Regulations do set
forth certain definite criteria for determining whether a particular
business entity is a corporation or something else. The four critical
standards are: (1) continuity of life; (2) centralization of manage-
ment; (3) limitation of liability; and (4) free transferability of in-
terests2 If the unincorporated association has more of these corpo-
rate characteristics than noncorporate ones, it is classed as a corporar
tion for income tax purposes.30 Thus, the choice of a noncorporate
form which nevertheless is weighted with corporate characteristics
may defeat the tax expectations of the entity and its individual con-
stituents. How, then, do the various alternatives open to real estate
investors fit into the association picture?
1. The "Traditional," "Ordinary," or "Normal" Trust.- Single
tier taxation plus depreciation deduction pass-through can be imple-
mented through the traditional (as contrasted with a business) trust
form.3' To the unwary, the traditional trust presents itself as a
rather attractive vehicle for achieving tax depreciation pass-through
as well as near-corporate business attributes. The beneficiaries of a
traditional trust are normally not held personally liable for trust ob-
ligations; beneficial interests can be made freely transferable; the
trust survives the continuous succession of its beneficial interest-hold-
ers; and the trustee enjoys full power of management.
However, it must be realized that the private investment sponsor
of low and moderate income housing will be engaged in a rather con-
tinuous process of acquisition, operation, and disposal of real prop-
erty. These very activities, together with broad trustee discretion,
appear to have been proscribed by the Supreme Court's holding that
significant real estate operations under the control of a discretionary
trustee will subject a trust to corporate taxation as an association.32
29 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1965).
30 Id.
3' Treas. Reg. § 1.167(h)-l(b) (1964).
3 2 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) (and companion cases follow-
ing). E.g., in the lower courts, Abraham v. United States, 406 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir.
1969); National Sav. & Trust Co. v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1968).
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The High Court's decision with respect to trusts possessing all major
corporate characteristics could probably be supported by current
Treasury Regulations,;" where the approach is to attach corporate tax
treatment to a business form which has too many corporate traits, in
any combination. 4
There is also the possibility that, under state law, the insulation
from personal liability enjoyed by the beneficiaries of a normal or
traditional trust might be judicially withdrawn where the cestuis
have supervisory control over the trustees. 5 Of course, if by dint of
state law the beneficiaries of a trust are not protected from personal
liability, it could be urged that the trust should be taxed as a partner-
ship. 0  While such a retrenchment might result in the desired tax
treatment, it would be an unsatisfactory solution to the investors'
need for limited liability. It is also conceivable that a trust would
continue to be treated as an association for tax purposes, notwith-
standing the unlimited personal liability of its beneficiaries. This
most unhappy situation could follow from the tabulation-of-attri-
butes analysis contained in the Regulations, because the trust might
still possess three of the four major corporate characteristics. To
steer clear of this eventuality, another corporate attribute, such as
free transferability, might be deleted from the trust structure. But if
resort must be had to such contortions in order to obtain partnership-
type noncorporate tax treatment for a trust, it seems hardly worth
the candle to cast the enterprise in the trust form to begin with.
33 The general analysis announced in the regulations presents a rather mechanically
arithmetic scheme of determining whether an ostensibly unincorporated business form
will receive corporate tax treatment See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965). Generally
speaking, noncorporate treatment is promised if an unincorporated organization has
fewer than three of the following characteristics: continuity of life (organizational iden-
tity not altered under local law by death, incapacity, insolvency, withdrawal, or expul-
sion of a member); centralization of management (d&cisional authority vested in a
group made up of fewer than all members); limited liability (members not personally
liable for the debts of the organization); and free transferability of interest (each mem-
ber empowered to sell all the rights and privileges of his interest without consent of
other members). Id.
34 CODE § 7701(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b) (1960).
35 E.g., Old River Farms Co. v. Roscoe Haeglin Co., 98 Cal. App. 331, 276 P. 1047
(1929) (business trust treated as a partnership in determining beneficiaries' personal
liability). See also Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 P. 624 (1930); E. LATTY
& G. FRAMPTON, BASIC BUSINESS AssociATioNs 592-93 (1963). "The test is
whether the trust instrument gives the shareholders 'ultimate control.' If so, a part-
nership, or at least something with many of the characteristic partnership jural at-
tributes, ensues .... " Barrett & deValpine, Taxation of Business Trusts and Other
Unincorporated Massachusetts Entities with Transferable Shares, 40 BOSTON U.L REv.
329, 333 (1960).
30 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b) (1960); see Rev. Rul. 64-220, 1964-2 CUM. BULL.
335.
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As a theoretical matter, it would be difficult to obtain normal
trust-type noncorporate tax treatment where the trust involves active
conduct of real estate operations. The most appealing case for such
treatment would involve an arrangement with all the typical charac-
teristics of a passive investment inter vivos or testamentary trust.
The beneficiaries' freedom from personal liability and lack of power
to direct trust activities would distinguish the trust from a partner-
ship. Absence of free transferability of interests, limitation of the
life of the trust by reference to designated beneficiaries, and lack of
beneficiaries' control over the activities of the trustee would probably
avoid corporate tax treatment.37 The result: trust-type noncorporate
taxation - at least under the Regulations. But the Supreme Court's
test does not seem to be so rigidly mathematical. Broad trustee dis-
cretion and the operation of 'business assets may have been the most
critical factors for the Court.38 In any event, to bolster the chances
for normal trust taxation, it would be necessary to circumscribe the
trustee's powers so as to emphasize the traditional function of con-
serving assets.3" Such an approach is hardly possible in a tax shelter
context where investment turnover is clearly contemplated. On bal-
ance, therefore, it appears that the trust, because of dangerously un-
certain tax treatment and the possibility of unlimited personal liabil-
ity for the beneficiaries, is not the optimum organizational vehicle
for low and moderate income housing construction, rehabilitation,
operation, and sale.
The real estate investment trust, an admitted association and a
distinct business form for federal tax purposes, receives special treat-
ment under the Code and is dealt with in later material.4 0
2. Limited Partnership.
a. Corporate or Partnership Tax Treatment? - The limited
partnership is undoubtedly the most popular form of entity in real
estate syndication. It enjoys this popularity because of two salient
features. First, it allows a distinction between limited and general
partners.4 The former are basically investors who do not participate
in the management of the enterprise. Unlike the general partners,
they are not liable individually for partnership obligations, and this
3 7 Curt Teich Trust, 25 T.C. 884 (1956), Acq., 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 8.
38 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 357, 359 (1936).
39 See Cleveland Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1940) (no
trustee power to buy, sell, or deal in operational real estate). Cf. Lewis & Co. v. Com-
missioner, 301 U.S. 385 (1937).
40 CODE §§ 856-58. See discussion accompanying notes 75-84 infra.
4 1 UNIFoRM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1 [hereinafter cited as U.L.P.A.].
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limitation of liability continues as long as the limited partner does
not participate in the central management of the partnership busi-
ness.42 Second, the limited partnership has a built-in mechanism for
centralization of management, since management power must neces-
sarily inhere in the general partner or partners. Clearly, this is an
ideal situation for real estate syndication, since it permits the promot-
ers of the enterprise to assume managerial responsibility as general
partners. As a corollary, however, the promoters as general partners
must assume unlimited liability for partnership obligations as in an
ordinary partnership. The limited partnership does, therefore, com-
bine the tax advantage of a noncorporate form with the nontax
corporate characteristics of limited liability and centralization of
management. 3  Its popularity as a real estate investment vehicle is
therefore quite understandable and is well earned.
The possibility that the limited partnership may be classified as
an "association" and therefore taxed as a corporation is an ever pres-
ent danger.44  However, careful draftsmanship of the partnership
agreement permits the general and limited partners to run the maze
created by the applicable Regulations and thus to achieve the tax re-
ward. An examination of the Regulations and the manner in which
they apply the four basic standards to the limited partnership will
be helpful in pointing the way.
(i) Continuity of Life.- Under the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act, the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner
will dissolve the partnership unless the remaining general partners
(if any) continue the operation of the partnership business pursuant
to authority granted in the certificate or by agreement of all the part-
ners.45 It is entirely possible that where a limited partnership certif-
icate provides for automatic continuation of the partnership by the
remaining general partners, without -the requirement of consent or
agreement of the remaining partners, the partnership may be re-
garded as having continuity of life. On the other hand, if the certif-
icate does not provide for automatic continuation of the business
and makes continuation contingent upon consent of the remaining
partners, it would appear that this element of uncertainty is sufficient
to negate the existence of continuity. Unfortunately, the Regula-
tions are not entirely dear on this point. One Regulation on the sub-
42 Id. § 7.
43 See Bernstein, Limited Partnerships - Their Use in Real Estate Syndications, 46
TAXEs 549 (1968).
44 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1965).
45 U.L.P.A. § 20.
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ject provides that if the consequence of death, insanity, or retirement
of a general partner is dissolution unless the remaining general part-
ners or all remaining partners agree to continue the partnership, then
continuity of life does not exist.46 On the basis of this Regulation, it
appears that a certificate provision for automatic continuation does
in fact create continuity. However, a subsequent Regulation con-
cludes: "Accordingly . a limited partnership subject to a statute
corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act [lacks] con-
tinuity of life."47  On the basis of the latter provision, it appears
that a limited partnership organized under the Uniform Act does not
have continuity of life. However, since the prior provision casts some
doubt as to the existence of continuity where the certificate of limited
partnership automatically provides for continuation, the best course
to follow in drafting the certificate is simply to provide the necessary
element of uncertainty, that is, to make the continuation contingent
upon the agreement of all the remaining general partners.48  This
will insure absence of the continuity of life attribute.
In the limited partnership which utilizes a corporation as a gen-
eral partner, the problem is somewhat more complicated. Here, of
course, durability of the general partner is not subject to the vagaries
of death or insanity. However, a corporate general partner can with-
draw from the partnership. It may be dissolved by action of the
stockholders or dissolved involuntarily for nonpayment of licenses
or for other reasons. The conclusion seems warranted, therefore,
that a limited partnership using a corporate general partner should
take the same precautions to avoid the continuity of life attribute as
the one which uses an individual or individuals.
(ii) Centralized Management.- A limited partnership ad-
mittedly has the centralized management which is characteristic of
a corporation. However, the Treasury Regulations provide that
"limited partnerships subject to a statute corresponding to the Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act, generally do not have centralized
management, but centralized management ordinarily does exist in
such a limited partnership if substantially all the interests in the
partnership are owned by the limited partners. 49
While the Regulation does not elucidate on just what sort of in-
terest must be held by the general partners to avoid "substantially all"
46 Treas, Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (2) (1965).
4 TTreas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (3).
4 8 See Bernstein, supra note 43, at 554.
4 9 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1965) (emphasis added).
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interests being held by the limited ones, it seems clear that the regula-
tion is aimed at preventing a total separation of ownership and man-
agement. That is, as long as management (the general partners) has
some significant portion of the proprietary interest, the Commissioner
is willing to respect the partnership status of the limited partnership.
In -the vast majority of real estate limited partnerships, the general
partners do have significant interests. They usually constitute the
promotional group and they -have generally committed their own
funds to the initial costs of securing options, making downpayments
on contracts, arranging financing, etc. 0
(iii) Limited Liability.- The Regulations are similarly kind
to limited partnerships as regards the corporate characteristic of
limited liability. In general, the regulations reflect the Commission-
er's readiness to overlook this essentially corporate attribute where
the general partners have personal liability, that is, where they have
substantial assets (outside the partnership) available for satisfaction
of partnership obligations or where they are not mere "dummies" act-
ing as agents of the limited partners.51 Thus, even though a general
partner does not have substantial assets other than its interest in the
partnership, the general partner will be deemed to be personally
liable if he is not an agent for the limited partners.52  In the normal
syndicate, the general partners will have no difficulty in satisfying
this regulation, though again, there may be some question as to just
what constitutes "substantial assets" over and above the general
partnership interest.
The same Regulation deals with the interesting question of
whether a corporation may act as a general partner in a limited part-
nership. The treatment of a corporate general partner parallels the
treatment provided for noncorporate general partners; that is, if the
corporation -has substantial assets other than the partnership interest,
50 See Aronsohn, supra note 28, at 647-48. Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-
3(b) (2), Examples (1) and (2), establishes what appears to be a ratio test for deter-
mining when the limited partners own "substantially all of the interests" in the partner-
ship. The examples postulate two situations: one where the limited partners have
contributed $5,000,000 as compared to an aggregate contribution of $300,000 by the
general partners, and another in which the limited partners have contributed $5,000,000
as compared to the general partners' $150,000. In both examples, while the general
partners' contributions are "substantial" in an absolute sense, they are not "substantial"
in the relative sense. In each example, therefore, the Regulation concludes that the lim-
ited partners own "substantially all of the interests" in the partnership and that, in
each example, there is centralization of management because of such ownership. The
Regulation does not indicate what sort of ratio of ownership will prevent this result.
51Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(d)(1), 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1965).
52 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (2).
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then it is considered to be personally liable for partnership obliga-
tions, notwithstanding the fact that such personal liability is limited
to corporate assets. 53 Presumably, the requirement that such a cor-
porate general partner shall not be a "dummy acting as the agent of
the limited partners'L5 also applies. This latter provision, how-
ever, raises some difficult questions. For example, what -is the effect
of this Regulation on the status of the corporate general partner
where the limited partners are also shareholders in the corporation?
Clearly, a corporation whose stock is wholly owned by all the limited
partners cannot escape treatment as a "dummy." But what of the
corporation whose stock is somewhat more widely held and only
some fraction of whose stock is held by the limited partners, or all of
whose stock -is owned by several (but not all) of them? Will in-
formal rules of ownership attribution be developed in such cases?
What percentage of stock ownership will render the corporation a
dummy and an agent? What if the partners own securities of such
a corporation other than voting common stock? These questions
are not answered in the Regulations nor do they appear to have been
litigated. If a corporation is to be used as a general partner, and if
there is some common ownership of stock and limited partnership
interest, these issues will have to be given serious consideration.
If they are found to be agents or dummies, the general partners
would not possess unlimited personal liability, unless they had sub-
stantial assets besides their interests in the partnership. But even
where the general partners are not deemed to have personal liability
because they lack non-partnership assets and are agents for the limi-
ted partners, the corporate attribute of limited liability will gen-
erally not attach to the limited partnership because the limited part-
ners, by virtue of their control over the partnership affairs, will be
personally liable for obligations of the partnership as a matter of
state law.55 It can be rather safely concluded, therefore, that a
limited partnership will not receive a limited liability tag except in
the unusual case where the general partners have no substantial non-
partnership assets and are agents of the limited partners and where
the limited partners do not, by virtue of state law, lose their limited
liability because of their intrusions into management.
(iv) Free Transferability of Interests.- Treasury Regula-
tion section 301.7701-2(e) (1) provides that an organization will be
53 Id.
54 Id.
551d.; U.L.P.A. § 7.
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deemed to possess the corporate characteristic of free transability of
interests if each of its members, or those owning substantially all of
the interests in the organization, may, without the consent of other
members, substitute for themselves a person who is a nonmember.
In a limited partnership, where substantially all of the interests in
the partnership will be held by the limited partners, this presents no
real problem. First, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act provides
that substitution of an assignee as a limited partner can take place
only when authorized by the partnership certificate or with the con-
sent of all of the members of the partnership." Thus, in a partner-
ship organized under the Act, free transferability of interests, as de-
fined in the Regulation, does not exist. Second, even if the partner-
ship is not organized under the Act, this corporate characteristic can
be avoided by compliance with the Regulation, that is, by incorporat-
ing into the agreement a restrictive provision which requires the
consent of the other members of the partnership. Treasury Regu-
lation section 301.7701-3 (b) (2), states that a restriction requiring
the consent of all the general partners to the substitution of a
limited partner will be sufficient to prevent the existence of free
transferability. In an example preceding the regulatory comment,
30 limited partners contributed $5,000,000 while three general part-
ners contributed $100,000 each, and an assignee could not be substi-
tuted as a limited partner except -with the consent of the general
partners. It seems, therefore, that inclusion of such a restrictive pro-
vision is all that is necessary to defeat the free transferability of in-
terests. Such a provision would probably be advisable even where
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act governs the organization of
the partnership, simply out of an abundance of caution.
b. Partnership Tax Treatment.- The essential feature of part-
nership taxation is that the entity can pass through to its members its
own tax attributes, that is, items of income and deduction. In addi-
tion, it can pass on to its partners the same character which an item
of income or deduction -would have had in its own hands (the capi-
tal gain or ordinary income character of items of receipt, and the
capital or ordinary character of an item of expense or loss). ' The
ordinary common law trust and the REIT are, however, taxpaying en-
tities in their own right and their function as a conduit of tax attri-
butes is circumscribed by a complex system of rules.58
5CU.LP.A. § 19(4).
57 COD § 702(b).
58Id. §§ 641-83, 691-92, 856-58.
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A limited partnership is, however, if taxed as a partnership, a
true conduit of tax attributes. While a partnership is required to file
a tax return wherein it reports its taxable income as though it were,
indeed, a separate taxpaying entity, that return is essentially an in-
formation return only. Partnership tax attributes, such as items of
income and deduction, are taxed only to the individual partners ac-
cording to their respective shares in profits and losses or according to
special allocations made -in the partnership agreement. The partner-
ship does not pay a tax on its net income.59
This scheme of partnership taxation has had a profound effect
upon the choice of business form for the real estate investor. The
pass-through of partnership income and deductions makes it possible
for a group of investors to use the partnership form as a vehicle for
syndication of the real estate -investment and thereby to realize all of
the above described tax shelter benefits in their respective individual
capacities. The effects of the tax shelter are first reflected in the
partnership's information return and then passed through propor-
tionally to the partners. Partnership taxation, therefore, has been
one of the chief factors in the immense popularity of the partnership
as a vehicle for real estate syndication. 60
The combination of accelerated depreciation and financial lever-
age has certain other tax ramifications which are of interest to in-
vestors using the partnership entity. We have noted that the excess of
depreciation over amortization may give rise to a tax shelter. An ad-
ditional ramification is the effect of distributions on a partner's basis
in his partnership interest. Suppose, for example, that a rental real
estate syndicate has a cash flow of $50,000 from the property before
depreciation but after the payment of mortgage amortization in any
one year. Suppose further that the depreciation deduction will be
$40,000, leaving taxable income of $10,000 for the year. If the or-
ganization decides to distribute not only its taxable income, but all
available cash ($50,000), $40,000 of the distribution is obviously a
return of capital in the year of distribution. If we assume that there
are five equal participants each of whom contributed $50,000 in cash
(to be used for the downpayment on the property) and that the or-
ganization then executed a note and purchase money mortgage of
$750,000, what effect does the distribution have on the partners'
basis and how is the distribution taxed?
591d. §§ 701-04.
60See, e.g., Casey, supra note 29; Levy, Real Estate Partnerships, N.Y.U. 16TH
INST. ON FBD. TAx. 183 (1958).
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If the participants had used a corporation as a vehicle for the
syndicate the results would be as follows: Each shareholder would
have a basis of $50,000 in his stock. The corporation will pay a tax
on the taxable income, which will decrease the amount available for
distribution by, let us say, 50 percent or $5,000. The corporation's
earnings and profits for the year would be roughly $5,000 ($10,000
less federal taxes). Consequently, out of the $9,000 which each
shareholder would receive (1/5 of the total cash distribution of
$45,000), $1,000 would be considered a dividend paid out of earn-
ings and profits for the year.6 ' The balance would be a distribution
over and above earnings and profits and therefore could not be
treated as an ordinary dividend. Instead, it would be applied
against the shareholder's basis until that basis is exhausted, and any
amount distributed after the exhaustion of basis would be treated as
capital gain. 2 In our example, each shareholder's basis would be re-
duced to $42,000 and each would have received a taxable dividend
of $1,000.
In a partnership, the situation is considerably altered because of a
number of statutory provisions peculiar to partnerships. First, a
partner's basis in his partnership interest is, in general, increased an-
nually by his distributive share of partnership taxable income for the
year13 and is decreased by any cash distributions and the partner's
share of losses. 4 Furthermore, a partner's basis in his partnership
interest includes his proportionate share of partnership liabilities.65
Thus, in the hypothetical example, each partner's basis in his part-
nership interest will consist initially of his cash contribution ($50,-
000) and his 1/5 share of the mortgage indebtedness ($150,000),
or a total basis of $200,000. To this basis, there will be added (in
the year of distribution) the $2,000 of partnership taxable income
allocable to each partner, and there will be subtracted from basis a
total of $10,000, consisting of $2,000 of taxable net income and
$8,000 of depreciation fund flow. The result, obviously, will be
taxable ordinary income of $2,000 and a net reduction in basis of
$8,000, so that each partner will now have a basis of $192,000 in his
partnership interest.
This example further illustrates the advantages inherent in the
61 CoDE § 316.
U2"rhis treatment is set forth in CODE § 301(c).
63 Id. § 705(a)(1).
64Id. §§ 705 (a) (2), 733.
05 Id. §§ 722, 752(a).
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partnership entity. Obviously, a 'basis provision which provides
that a partner's share of partnership liabilities may be added to his
basis in the partnership is of critical importance in a real estate ven-
ture relying heavily on mortgage financing. If a corporation had
been used in the above example, distributions at times when there
were no earnings and profits would be tax-free to the shareholders
only until the $50,000 basis had been exhausted, whereas, if a part-
nership had been used, each partner would 'be able to receive tax
free distributions to the extent of $200,000.66
It should be noted that the foregoing discussion of the effect of
the mortgage liability on a partner's basis applies to the usual situa-
tion of partners in a general partnership. To gain the same treat-
ment for all of the partners, general and limited, in a limited part-
nership, further refinements are necessary. Limited partners are not,
after all, liable for the obligations of the partnership, whereas gen-
eral partners are. It seems logical, therefore, that in a general part-
nership a partner's pro rata share of a partnership liability should be
treated as a contribution of money to the partnership, regardless of
whether the obligation has been personally assumed or is merely an
obligation of the entity." The limited partner's situation, however,
is that he is not liable for partnership obligations except to the extent
of his actual or required contribution to the partnership.6 8  It is
only the general partners who are liable without limitation for the ob-
ligations of the limited partnership. In recognition of this fact, the
Regulations provide that, in the case of a limited partnership, "a
limited partner's share of partnership liabilities shall not exceed the
difference between the actual contribution credited to him by the
partnership and the contribution which he is obligated to make un-
der the limited partnership agreement."69  Presumably, the purpose
of this limitation is to avoid crediting a limited partner with addi-
tional basis in respect of a partnership debt for which the general
partner may be held liable in full. Thus it is only where the limited
partner's actual contribution exceeds his subscription (the amount
6 6 Moreover, if the partnership has a net operating loss, a partner may take a share
of such loss to the extent of the adjusted basis in his partnership interest. CODE §
704(d). Adjusted basis is then reduced by the partner's share of losses. Thus, even
where there are no cash distributions to the partners, it is extremely important that a
partner start with as high a basis as possible so that he can continue to take advantage
of tax loss pass-throughs.
67 CODE § 752(a).
68U.L.P.A. §§ 7, 17.
6 9 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
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he is obligated to pay) or where he has not yet fully paid the sub-
scription that he is permitted to add to his basis. This follows
logically, since he could be held liable for the full amount of his
subscription when it has not been fully paid, and this fact should be
reflected by allowing him to add to his basis a share of partnership
liabilities. The Regulation, however, then goes on to make a spe-
cial exception to this basis rule where none of the partners in a
limited partnership have any liability with respect to a partnership
obligation, specifically mentioning, by way of example, a mortgage
on real estate of the partnership acquired without assumption of lia-
bility by the partnership or by the partners.70 In these circumstances,
all of the partners, "including limited partners, shall be considered
as sharing such liability under section 752 (c) in the same proportion
as they share the profits. ' '7' Thus, where a limited partnership ac-
quires property subject to a mortgage, with no personal liability at-
taching to any partner, the liability (query, whether the encumbrance
should be called a liability under these circumstances) is allocated
pro rata among all the partners and the benefits connected with the
addition of the mortgage liability to basis are the same as for the
general partnership. Presumably, the rationale is that where no
partner is personally liable on the mortgage, a foreclosure will affect
both the general and limited partners of a limited partnership in
precisely the same way as it would affect the partners of a general
partnership. The loss would be suffered pro rata; hence, the same
treatment is prescribed and addition of the indebtedness to basis is
permitted. 72
The usual device employed by a limited partnership acquiring
property subject to a mortgage, without the assumption of personal
liability thereon by any partner, is to have the mortgage executed by
70 Id.
711 d.
72 If this is, in fact, the reasoning which underlies the regulation, then it is not en-
tirely sound. The Commissioner's assumption seems to be that a default in the pay-
ment of the mortgage will result inevitably in a foreclosure, both in the case of a gen-
eral or limited partnership. However, in the case of a general partnership in which
all of the partners have personally assumed the mortgage liability, it may well be that
a default will result in an action on the mortgage note without a suit to foreclose.
This would be unlikely, but certainly not unheard of. In such a situation, the posi-
tion of the general partnership and its partners cannot be considered substantially
similar to the position of all the partners in a limited partnership, none of whom have
personally assumed the mortgage indebtedness. In the former, each is personally
liable and can be sued on the note. In the latter, the only consequence of foreclosure
is a pro rata loss of equity in the property. It seems, therefore, that there is a flaw in
the rationale for allowing the limited and general partners of a limited partnership to
include the mortgage in their respective basis as a partnership liability when none of
the partners are personally liable thereon.
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a nominee for the partnership who subsequently transfers the fee to
the partnership, subject to the mortgage. Generally, the nominee
is a corporation organized for this purpose. 3 While this device is a
transparent avoidance of the limitations with respect to basis set
forth in Regulation section 1.752-1 (e), there is nothing in the Regu-
lations or in the cases to indicate that the Commissioner takes issue
with it.74
3. Real Estate Investment Trust.- A new approach to real es-
tate investment was formulated in 1960 by the enactment of Code
sections 856-58. These relatively recent Code provisions provide
for the establishment and taxation of an entity called a Real Estate
Investment Trust. In essence, they permit the establishment of a
common law business trust, to be managed by trustees for the benefit
of holders of beneficial interests in the trust, which, if it satisfies the
statutory provisions and regulatory requirements, will be taxed essen-
tially in the same manner as mutual fund7' The owners of benefi-
cial interests who receive distributions of trust income will be taxed
essentially in the same manner as mutual fund shareholders in re-
spect of such distributions.7 6
From a tax point of view, this means that a business trust having
all the desirable attributes of a corporation can be established as a
vehicle for real estate investment without suffering the full ramifi-
cations of corporate taxation. In effect, the trust will act as a conduit
whereby its distributable income will be taxed only to the beneficial
owners. Moreover, the character of the income so distributed will
be the same in the hands of the distributees as it would have been in
the hands of the trust; that is, ordinary income and capital gain dis-
tributions will retain their respective characters in the hands of
the distributees and will be taxed accordingly. 77
The purpose of these favorable tax provisions is to provide wide-
spread real estate investment opportunity for the moderate and small
investor, and to encourage the establishment of REITs to finance ur-
73 See Bernstein, supra note 40, at 555-56.
74The Commissioner, in Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969 INT. REv. BULL. NO. 18, at 12,
has ruled that a mortgage liability assumed by a limited partnership does not increase
the basis of limited partner's interest in the partnership, notwithstanding the fact that
the limited partner agreed to indemnify the general partners for payments which they
may be required to make in excess of their pro rata share of partnership liabilities.
This appears to be the only consideration which the Commissioner has given the prob-
lem.
7 5 Compare CODE § 857(b) with § 852(b).
7 6 CODE §§ 857(b) (3), 858.
771d. § 857(b)(3)(B).
HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS
ban real estate development.7s The enactment of REIT provisions
is a tacit recognition of the fact that the usual real estate syndicate,
operating as a limited partnership, is not an entirely satisfactory busi-
ness form for real estate investment. The tax objective of avoiding
taxation as a corporation and providing a tax shelter through depre-
ciation deductions can be achieved by the partnership only after the
most painstaking care in structuring the entity. The need to provide
the nontax corporate attributes of centralized management, contin-
uing life, limited liability, and transferability of interests cannot al-
ways be reconciled with achievement of the tax objective, or at best
the reconciliation is accompanied by uncertainty.
Assuming compliance with statutory and regulatory require-
ments, the REIT offers conduit tax treatment along with the flexibil-
ity of the desired nontax corporate attributes, including limited lia-
bility of beneficial owners. In addition, by registering the beneficial
interests as securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission
and under state blue sky laws, the REIT can appeal to a much larger
segment of the investment market than is available to the normal
syndicate. Wide participation enables the REIT to diversify its
holdings so that its fate is not determined by the success or failure
of a single investment.79
The statutory requirements for qualification as a REIT are set
forth in detail in section 856 of the Code. For the purposes of this
article, a detailed analysis of these provisions and of the regulations
thereunder would serve no useful purpose. In general, however, the
REIT must be organized as an unincorporated association managed
by trustees, and it must have transferable shares owned by at least
100 persons.8 0 The other basic requirements are:
At least 75% of the gross income of the REIT must be derived from:
-real property rents
-interest on obligations secured by mortgages on real property
-gain on the sale or other disposition of real property
-dividends or other distributions in respect of shares in other REITs
-gain from the sale or other disposition of shares in other REITs81
In addition to the foregoing requirements, the REIT must distrib-
ute to its shareholders 90 percent of its ordinary taxable income
78 See H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-8 (1960).
79 For a general discussion of REITs, their purposes and objectives, see Kelley, supra
note 23.
80 CODE § 856(a).
sld. § 856(c).
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for each tax year.82 Upon compliance with this requirement, each
shareholder is taxed at ordinary income rates on that portion of the
distribution which represents ordinary income of the REIT, and at
capital gain rates upon that portion which represents a distribution
of net long term capital gains. A deduction is allowed to the trust
in respect of dividends paid, so that only one tax is paid at the share-
holder level. A simple example will illustrate the effect of these
provisions. Assume that a REIT has aggregate general accounting
depreciation deductions of $150,000, tax depreciation deductions of
$200,000, net income and taxable income (before depreciation) of
$180,000, and mortgage amortization of $125,000. In this example,
fund flow is $55,000 (general accounting net income before depre-
ciation less mortgage amortization). Earnings and profits for tax
purposes (taxable income after tax depreciation) are minus $20,000.
Net income after general accounting depreciation is $30,000.
Therefore, if the REIT distributes its $30,000 net income, it will be
deemed a return of capital which reduces the shareholder's basis, be-
cause the corporation -has no earnings and profits. If the nondivi-
dend portion of the distribution exceeds the shareholder's basis in
the shares, there the excess over 'basis is treated as capital gain to the
shareholders. 8 Since tax depreciation deductions exceed income, a
net operating tax loss will result. If this occurs in the limited part-
nership, we have observed that the loss is passed through to the
partners and is available as an offset against their income from other
sources. This is not true in the REIT. The loss is not passed
through to the shareholders, nor is it available to the REIT as a
carry-over as in the case of a normal corporation."M
Clearly, the unavailability of the net operating loss deduction to
the individual REIT shareholder is a serious drawback in terms of
its attractiveness as a tax shelter. This would be particularly true
for large investors who are looking not only for sheltered invest-
ment income, but for an offset against other high bracket income.
However, it is also an equally serious drawback from the point of
view of the smaller investor who is primarily interested in a tax
821d. § 857(a)(1).
83 Earnings and profits of a REIT are determined under CODE § 857 (d) and Treas.
Reg. § 1.857-5. The distribution in excess of earnings and profits is treated in the
same manner as a similar distribution by a corporation under CoDE § 301(c).
84 COD3 § 857(b) (2) (E). The earnings and profits deficit can presumably be
used as an offset to undistributed earnings and profits of other years. Cf. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.857-5 (b). But this possibility will not be of aid in those years where distributions
are made and the trust has current earnings and profits. Id.; CODE § 31 6 (a) (2). See
also Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 452, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 270-71 (1969).
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sheltered investment. It frequently happens that an investment in
which accelerated depreciation exceeds the rate of mortgage amor-
tization will result in net operating losses. If the net operating loss
is not available as a deduction to the shareholders, then there is no
real shelter for income from other sources. The production of a net
operating loss means that there are no earnings and profits for the
year, hence the distribution will reduce the shareholders basis in the
REIT stock. When this basis has been reduced to zero, further dis-
tributions in the absence of earnings and profits will result in income
taxed at capital gain rates. Obviously, the limited partner in the or-
dinary syndicate is better situated from a tax point of view, since the
availability of loss pass through to him does create a more efficacious
tax shelter.
III. LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS FOR Low AND
MODERATE INCOME HOUSING PRODUCTION:
SPECIAL FINANCING AND TAx EFFECTS
A. Effects of Federal Mortgage Insurance on Cash
Contribution Required of the Sponsor.
A limited partnership may qualify as a limited distribution en-
tity eligible for federal mortgage insurance under the National Hous-
ing Act."5 As such, it can obtain debt financing of its low and mod-
erate income housing operations in an amount up to 90 percent of
construction costs.8 6
1. New Construction.--The limit on final mortgage insur-
ance endorsement (I.) in a new construction project can be stated
generally as 90 percent of the sum of actual cost of physical improve-
ments (A) plus the market value of land in the project (L).87 Ac-
tual cost, however, includes: amounts paid on a construction con-
tract (K); costs other than those incurred on a construction contract
(C); and a sponsor's profit on 10 percent of C.88 This can be ex-
pressed by the following formula:
85 National Housing Act §§ 221 (d) (3), 236(j) (3), 12 U.S.C.A. § 17151(d) (3),
1715z-l(j)(3) (1969); 34 FED. REG. 498, amendiag 24 C.F.R. § 221.510(c) (1969);
34 FED. REG. 500, amending 24 C.F.R. § 236.10(c) (1969). See discussion accom-
panying notes 95-99 for a treatment of limited distribution requirements.
8624 C.FR. §§ 221.514(a)(2)(ii), (a)(3)(ii) (1969).
8724 C.F.R. §§ 221.547(a)(3)(i), 221.555 (1969).
8824 C.F.R. § 221.550a(c) (1969). Improvement costs (C) other than amounts
paid under a construction contract would include architect's fees, offsite public utilities
not provided under the construction contract, organizational and legal expenses, and
"other items of expense approved by the [FHAJ Commissioner." 24 C.F.R. § 221.550
(b)(2)-(5) (1969).
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m .9 (A + L)
- .9 (C+.1C+ K) + L
- .9 (1.1C + K + L)
- .99C + .9K + .9L
Thus, the loan limit for new construction is 99 percent of real costs,
other than construction contract costs and land value, plus 90 per-
cent of the latter two items. Under ideal circumstances, therefore,
the limited partnership's cash contribution could be a relatively small
portion of real costs. To illustrate, suppose a new construction
model wherein land for construction of low and moderate income
housing is purchased for $200,000, an amount which represents
its market value. Non-land costs (other than sponsor profit)
amount to $700,000 to be paid on a construction contract and
$100,000 for other expenses. In such a case, federal mortgage in-
surance would be available in a maximum amount as follows:
.9 (100,000 + 10,000) + 700,000 + 200,000
90,000 + 9,000 + 630,000 + 180,000
909,000
Such a project would require a cash contribution from the sponsor in
the amount of $91,000, or 9.1 percent of the million dollar real cost
package. 9
Special note should be taken of the fact that the formula for
computing the maximum insurable mortgage for new construction
includes 90 percent of the value of the land in the project.90 Pur-
chase price of the land is not controlling. Thus, if the land in the
89 There are several fees involved in the organization of an FHA insured project,
including application and commitment fees totaling .3 percent of the loan commit-
ment, 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.503, .504 (1969); an inspection fee not to exceed .5 percent of
commitment, 24 C.F.R. § 221.505 (1969); a possible mortgagee financing fee of no
more than 2 percent of the original amount of the mortgage, 24 C.F.R. § 221.508
(1969); and an insurance premium of .5 percent, 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.755, 207.252(1969). The commitment and inspection fees may be cancelled by the FHA Commis-
sioner, 24 C.F.R. § 221.507 (1969), and the insurance premium is not applicable to
below market interest rate (BMIR) loan programs, 24 C.F.R. § 221.518(b) (1969);
34 FED. REG. 499, amending 24 C.F.R. § 221.755 (1969). In any event, the above
fees may be included in actual cost (A).
If special mortgage assistance is sought from the General National Mortgage As-
sociation (GNMA), an additional fee of about 1.5 percent of the loan will be incurred.
This fee is not generally certifiable as part of actual costs, but, under FHA practice, will
be allowed as part of actual costs to the extent that the sponsor is able to show savings
in construction costs over his initial estimates.
Finally, the limited distribution sponsor may be required to deposit in escrow cer-
tain other amounts to cover such things as the equipping and renting of the project, 24
C.F.R. § 221.540 (1969), although some of these requirements can be met by a letter
of credit.
90 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.554, .555 (1969).
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new construction model could have been purchased for $109,000 in-
stead of $200,000, there would be no cash contribution required of
the sponsor "1 since the real costs of the project would then equal the
maximum insurable mortgage.
Where an "identity of interest" exists between the mortagagor
and the general contractor, the formula: for computing the maxi-
mum insurable mortgage for new construction shifts a -bit. While
the general rule remains 90 percent of actual cost (A) plus 90 per-
cent of the market value of land (L), the term "actual cost" now in-
cludes a sponsor's profit of 10 percent of all costs (Ca), includ-
ing those involved in construction (except, of course, a builders fee,
which the 10 percent sponsor's profit is meant to supplant)92 The
formula then becomes:
I= = .9 [(C. + .1C.) + L]
= .99C. + .9L
Assuming that land for a new construction project is purchased
at its fair market of $200,000 and that other costs (not including a
builder's fee) will amount to $800,000, the maximum insurable
mortgage would be computed as follows:
.,= .9 [(800,000 + 80,000) + 200,000]
= 720,000 + 72,000 + 180,000
= 972,000
In this situation, the actual cash contribution required of the spon-
sor would be $28,000 (2.8 percent), and even this could be avoided
if the land had been purchased at $172,000.
2. Rehabilitation.- In connection with rehabilitation, where
there is no identity of interest between the sponsor and the general
contractor, the maximum insurable mortgage is calculated by using
a formula which is slightly different from that employed in the new
construction context. As in new construction, 90 percent of the ac-
tual cost (A) of physical improvement is covered. Again, actual
cost includes a 10 percent sponsor profit on costs (C) other than
amounts paid on a construction contract (K). However, unlike the
new construction computation, the land factor is based on 90 per-
cent of the lower of cost to the sponsor or market (Lcm).93 Thus,
for a rehabilitation model involving costs of land and buildings of
$500,000, amounts paid on a rehabilitation construction contract of
9lExcept to the extent that the sponsor may be required to make certain escrow
deposits or to pay GNMA fees described in note 89 supra.
9224 C.F.R. § 221.550a(b) (1969).
93 Id. § 221.556(c) (1969).
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$400,000, and other costs of $100,000, the mathematical expression
of maximum insurable debt would be:
1. = .9 (A + &-)
= .9 [(C + .AC + K) + Lc.]
- .9 [(100,000 + 10,000 + 400,000) + (500,000)1
- 90,000 + 9,000 + 360,000 + 450,000
909,000
The sponsor would be required to make a $91,000 (9.1 percent)
cash contribution. This contribution could not be eliminated, as it
could have been in connection with new construction, by purchasing
the land for $91,000 less than its market value.
If an identity of interest exists between the sponsor and the
general contractor, then the method of determining maximum in-
surable debt modulates again to 90 percent of actual cost (A) plus
90 percent of the lower of cost or market of land in the project
(Lcm), where actual cost includes a sponsor's profit of 10 percent
of all costs (C.) except a builder's fee.14 If it be assumed that
the rehabilitation model includes land and building costs of $500,-
000, construction costs of $400,000, and other costs of $100,000,
the maximum insurable mortgage would be arrived at as follows:
Im = .9 [(c, ± .lC.) + Li.aJ
- .99C. + .9ILio
- .99 (500,000) + .9 (500,000)
- 945,000
Actual cash contribution required of the sponsor would be $55,000,
or 5.5 percent of the million dollar real cost project.
B. Limitations on Cash Distributions.
A critical -factor in tax shelter arrangements -is a high ratio of
debt to equity. In the production of low and moderate income
housing, an unusually high borrowing capacity is facilitated by
mortgage insurance. Previous discussion has demonstrated the rel-
atively small equity contribution that may be required, especially in
new construction, if the enterprise qualifies for federal mortgage
insurance as a limited distribution mortgagor.95
In order to be eligible for 90 percent federal mortgage insur-
ance, a limited partnership would have to restrict its cash distribu-
tions to six percent of initial equity investment. This applies
941d. § 221.550a(b) (1969).
95 See note 85 supra.
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to both new construction and rehabilitation projects.96 Precisely
what is meant -by the phrase "initial equity investment" is unclear.
1. New Construction; Prior Regulations.-Prior Regulations
specified a cash distribution limit with respect to new construction
of "6 percent of the product of 11.11 percent times the finally en-
dorsed amount of the insured mortgage."97  The rationale of this
restriction seems to be that private inurement ought not exceed 6
percent of 10 percent of a total amount of which 90 percent is bor-
rowed. It should be observed that 11.11 percent of the debt ele-
ment of a project is also 10 percent of an amount of which the debt
constitutes a 90 percent part.
Using the new construction model already mentioned, where it
is assumed that an insured mortgage of $909,000 could be obtained,
it appears that cash distributions would be limited under the old
Regulations to 6 percent of 11.11 percent of $909,000, or about
$6,060. This result is based on the presumption that the equity
investment of the limited distribution sponsor is 11.11 percent of
the insured loan, or, put another way, 10 percent of a total package
of which $909,000 constitutes 90 percent. In this manner, the con-
structive total package is $1,010,000 and the imputed equity in-
vestment of the limited distribution sponsor is $101,000. As we
have seen, the initial cash contribution for such a project would
actually amount to about $91,000, and could be considerably less
than that. The interesting upshot of the prior restriction is that,
upon an actual cash contribution of $91,000, a distribution of net
income of $6,060, or 6.7 percent, would have been permissible.
2. Present Regulation.
a. New Construction.--The present regulatory control on dis-
tribution is not so mechanical, however, and it is difficult to say
whether the notion of imputed equity will be perpetuated in deter-
mining initial equity investment. One alternative would be to limit
the concept to the actual cash contribution made by the sponsor.
Referring again to the new construction model, it has already been
shown that the actual cash investment consisted of real costs not
covered by the insured loan in the amount of $91,000. If this
figure were used as the base for the 6 percent limit, the maximum
distribution would be about $5,460.
This tack does not appear to be the one which HUD is taking
9624 C.F.R. § 221.532(a) (1969); 34 FED. REG. 6981, amending 24 C.F.R. §
236.50(a) (1969).
97 24 C.F.R. § 221.532(a) (1968), as amended, 24 C.F.R. 221.532(a) (1969).
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under the revised regulatory language. Rather, it appears that
FHA is following a practice of computing initial equity investment
by subtracting the amount of the finally insured mortgage from
the sum of actual cost of improvements plus value attributable to
land.98  Since actual cost includes a sponsor's profit, the equity base
for determining maximum allowable distributions will continue to
contain an imputed equity factor. For instance, based on the new
construction model where there is no identity of interest between
the sponsor and the general contractor, initial equity investment
would be computed as follows:
Actual cost of physical improvements ----------- $ 810,000
Value of land ----------------------------- 200,000
Total land and improvements ------------------ 1,010,000
Less: Amount of insured mortgage --------------- 909,000
Initial equity investment -------------------- $ 101,000
Distribution would be limited to $6,060. Hence, under the new
Regulations, as under the old, constrictive equity plays a role.99
b. Rehabilitation.- The initial equity investment language
now applies to both new and rehabilitated projects. Based on the
figures used in the rehabilitation model, the equity base would be
computed as follows:
Actual cost of physical improvements ----------- 510,000
Cost of land -------------------------------- 500,000
Total land and improvements --- 1,010,000
Less: Amount of insured mortgage --------------- 909,000
Initial equity investment --------------------- $ 101,000
Consequently, the maximum cash distribution permitted would be
$6,060.
c. Summary.- In the foregoing examples, the actual cash con-
98 Based on the writers' informal conversations with FHA personnel, it appears
that an intra-agency procedure has evolved whereby initial equity investment is estab-
lished by reference to FHA Form 2580. Item (10), entitled "Maximum Insurable
Mortgage," is subtracted from Item (6), entitled "Total Land and Improvements."
99 The effect of imputed equity is even more striking in the case where, because of
an identity of interest, the sponsor is entitled to certify, as part of actual cost, 10 percent
of all costs other than land. See discussion accompanying note 92 supra. In that case,
total land and improvements equaled $1,080,000 and the insurable mortgage equaled
$972,000, producing an initial equity investment of $108,000, even though the spon-
sor's actual cash investment in the project amounted to $28,000. Applying the 6 per-
cent limitation rate, it appears that a cash distribution of up to $6,480 - about 23
percent of actual cash contribution - would be allowed.
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tribution required to be made by a limited partnership in a federally
insured low and moderate income new construction project ranged
from a maximum of 9.1 percent to a minimum of zero percent of
real costs. In rehabilitation, the required contribution varied from
a maximum of 9.1 percent to a minimum 5.5 percent of real costs.
For purposes of further discussion, reference will be made pri-
marily to the 9.1 percent models, since they seem to represent con-
servative approaches to fairly realistic million-dollar projects.
C. How Does It All Work? An Operational Prototype.
So far, the analysis has dwelt upon (1) the best organizational
vehicle for tapping the tax incentives offered by accelerated de-
preciation, (2) the manner in which federal mortgage insurance
diminishes the equity investment required of limited distribution
sponsors of low and moderate income rental housing, and (3) the
limitations on cash distributions available to profit-motivated spon-
sors who avail themselves of the high debt-to-equity leverage made
possible by FHA backing. What remains is to illustrate how this
mixture of tax law and specialized mortgage financing can be
blended to produce a feasible and attractive opportunity for private
investment in desperately needed rental housing. For purposes of
pro forma analysis, the $1 million new construction model (where
there is no identity of interest between the general contractor and
the sponsor) will again be drawn into service" 0 - with some em-
bellishments necessary to facilitate subsequent discussion.
The partners of a limited partnership have made an actual cash
contribution of $91,000 toward a -million dollar project - borrow-
ing the remaining $909,000 pursuant to a loan which is federally
insured under section 236 of the National Housing Act.1' 1  The
partners' aggregate tax basis will be $1,000,000.102 Of the $1 mil-
'o
0 See discussion accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
101 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1 (1969).
1021f there are one general partner and nine limited partners, and they all contrib-
bute $9,100 to the project, each will have a basis of $100,000, provided they have
agreed to share profits equally and provided also that the $909,000 debt is not the per-
sonal obligation of the partnership or any of the general partners. See discussion ac-
companying notes 65-74 supra. In the context of FHA financing, the requirement
that neither the limited partnership nor the general partners be personally liable on the
debt may cause severe problems. On the one hand, it is hardly likely that FHA will in-
sure a mortgage for a nominee or dummy entity which is to be personally liable on
the mortgage but which will immediately transfer the mortgaged property to another
operating entity, such as a limited partnership, "subject to" the mortgage. On the
other hand, the Commissioner apparently will object to limited partners adding a por-
tion of the debt to their basis, unless the general partners have no personal liability
on the mortgage.
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lion total package, $200,000 will be allocated to the purchase of
non-depreciable land, $750,000 to new depreciable structures, and
the remaining $50,000 to non-capital expenses or nondepreciable
items.
Amortization of debt principal for the first year of operation
will be estimated at $18,750,103 and, for the purpose of dramatizing
the tax shelter effects of accelerated depreciation, it will be assumed
that the book net income of the project, after deduction of all ex-
penses including straight line depreciation, will be exactly equal to
amortization payments on the mortgage.10 4 The straight line de-
preciation percentage on a 40 year useful life will be 2.5 percent, or
$18,750 based on the $750,000 allocated to depreciable property.
Double declining balance tax depreciation will be $37,500.
On the above assumptions, the following analysis results:
Partnership Taxable Income
Net income after straight line depredation ---------- $ 18,750
Less: additional depreciation using 200% declining
balance --------------------------------- 18,750
Partnership Taxable Income --------------------- 0-
Fund Flow
Net income after straight line depreciation --------- $ 18,750
Add back: book depreciation ------------------- 18,750
37,500
Less: amortization --------------------------- 18,750
Fund flow ------------------------------ $ 18,750
Some very interesting conclusions can be drawn from this finan-
cial picture. First, net income has been completely sheltered from
taxes. The net income figure represents a return on the partnership
investment of over 20 percent. Since there will be no tax to the
partners, this return is equivalent to a fully taxable net income of
nearly $37,500 or about 41 percent of investment, assuming the in-
come would be taxed to the partners at a 50 percent bracket rate.
Even if it be assumed that the rental housing plant is in fact de-
preciating at the straight line rate, the partnership is, in effect, pur-
103 This figure is not unrealistic in view of the debt service reduction payments which
are made by HUD, pursuant to section 236, to the mortgagee of an insured projec
Such payments make the sponsor's share of debt service very close to that involved in a
1 percent loan.
104 This assumption, while seemingly conservative, is probably not unusual in the
real world of inner-city rental housing.
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chasing an undepreciated portion of the project out of currently tax-
free net income.105
Because fund flow equals $18,750, cash distributions could be
made -in amounts up to the FHA maximum of $6,060,18 or 6.7 per-
cent of investment. Being currently tax free, the distribution is
tantamount to more than a 13 percent payout taxed to the recipient
at a 50% bracket rate. Upon such a distribution, the aggregate
basis of the partners' interests in the partnership would be reduced
by $6,060.107
A simple variant of the preceding analysis portrays an even
more striking picture of tax sheltering effects. If, for example, as
much as $850,000 were to be allocated to depreciable structures,
straight line depreciation would be increased to $21,250 and 200
percent declining balance would rise to $42,500. Assuming first of
all that net income and taxable income after straight line deprecia-
tion increased to $21,250, the partnership would have tax-free net
income of $21,250 and fund flow of $23,750. Alternatively, if it
be assumed that net and taxable income after straight line depreda-
tion remained at $18,750, the partnership would have tax-sheltered
net income of $18,750 and a depreciation pass-through to the in-
dividual partners of $2,500 which, if the partners had taxable in-
come from other sources in the 50 percent bracket, would result in
a tax saving of $1,250. L s
105 Because the net income used to purchase nondepreciated portions of the project
will probably be taxed - as capital gain, at least - when the rental housing is ulti-
mately sold, a long range appraisal of the investment return might more properly be
$18,750 less the future capital gains taxes for a 50 percent bracket taxpayer. Ignoring
the currently operative surtax, net income after capital gains taxes would then exceed
$14,000, or over 15 percent of investment. See text accompanying notes 121-24 infra.
Regarding the question of whether gain upon sale will be taxed as ordinary or capital
gain, see the second paragraph of note 108 infra.
106 See discussion accompanying notes 95-99 supra.
107 CODE §§ 705(a) (2), 733(1).
108 The text examples deal only with new construction. In rehabilitation projects,
the effects of accelerated depreciation will be attenuated because basis attributable to
pre-1954 structures, acquired after 1953, can be depreciated at a maximum of 150 per-
cent declining balance, if the taxpayer is not the original user. CODE § 16 7(c)(2);
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-0(b) (1956). Of course, that portion of the structure which
is new will create a reconstruction basis, depreciable at the 200 percent rate. Treas.
Reg. § 1.167(c)-1(b)(1) (1956).
As this article is about to be printed, Congress appears to be on an erratic and con-
fusing course - at least with respect to tax incentives for the production of low and
moderate income housing. On the one hand, a very fast five year depredation of re-
habilitation costs would be added to Code section 167. Tax Reform Act of 1969, §
521(a), H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 303-05 (1969). On the other hand, the
reform package will eliminate the 150 percent declining balance depreciation which
can now be taken by non-original users with respect to non-reconstruction basis. Id.
at 302-03. Further, the gradual reduction of depreciation recapture over a ten year
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D. Other Attractions.
1. The National Housing Partnership.- It has been shown
that the amount of cash investment required of a limited distribu-
tion sponsor may be relatively small when compared with the total
real costs of a project. Nonetheless, it may happen that the amount
of equity required to produce rental housing on an economically ef-
ficient scale cannot be raised by private investors at the local level.
For instance, let it be assumed that a group of investors have pooled
$68,250 for construction of new low and moderate income rental
housing. Let it be further assumed, however, that adequate econ-
omies of scale cannot be achieved unless a million dollar real cost
project is initiated. The conservative new construction model in-
dicates that an equity investment of $91,000 will be required." 9
Whence the other 25 percent?
Title IX of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968110
purports to supply the answer. This legislation envisions three
tiers of financial commitment: a National Corporation, created
pursuant to Title IX and the District of Columbia Business Cor-
poration Act;"' a National Limited Partnership, created pursuant
to Title IX and the District of Columbia Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act,"2 in which the National Corporation would be the gen-
eral partner;1 ' and a local partnership, general or limited, or a
local joint venture, in which the National Partnership would be a
partner or joint venturer along with local investors." 4
To assure single-level taxation and maximum tax shelter for all
investors, from the top of the structure on down, shareholders of
the National Corporation will presumably make the bulk of their
investment by way of limited partnership interests in the National
Limited Partnership. Thus, most of the tax attributes arising from
period would be deleted from Code section 1250 with respect to depreciation in excess
of straight line taken after July 24, 1969, including the fast five year depreciation taken
under the new section applicable to rehabilitation costs. Id. § 521 (b), at 305-07. These
latter two amendments, together with the new limitation on so-called "preference" de-
ductions, id. § 301 (a) (1), at 165-69, would seriously impair the effectiveness of the
tax shelter incentive for private investment in low and moderate income housing un-
der FHA programs. See discussion accompanying notes 117-24 and 164-69 infra.
109 See discussion accompanying notes 81-89 supra.
11042 U.S.C.A. §§ 3931-40; 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (1969).
"' 42 U.S.C.A. § 3932(a) (1969)
112 Id §§ 3937(a), 3937(b) (1969).
1131d. § 3937(d) (1969). The National Corporation's functions are not limited
to being general partner in the National Limited Partnership. See id. § 3936 (1969).
However, this appears to be one of its primary functions.
1141d. § 3937(c) (1969).
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the National Limited Partnership's activities, either alone or in con-
cert with local partnerships, will be fed directly to the national-
level investors (in their capacity as members of the National
Limited Partnership), rather than through the National Corpora-
tion. 115
The National Limited Partnership is authorized to take up to 25
percent of the equity investment of local partnerships engaged in
115 It appears that 500 shareholders will initially purchase $2.5 million worth of
National Corporation stock and at the same time take $47.5 million worth of National
Limited Partnership interests pro rata according to their percentage interests in the
corporation, with no shareholder holding more than 5 percent of the National Corpora-
tion's shares. Some portion of the National Corporation's capital would presumably
be invested in the National Limited Partnership. See Wall Street J., Feb. 5, 1969, at
1, col. 1 (midwest ed.). The contemplated financial structure would, were it not for
corrective devices built into the statute, raise some severe tax and limited partnership
problems. On the tax side, apart from the question of whether the National Limited
Partnership may be treated as an association for tax purposes, see discussion accompany-
ing notes 41-55 supra, there is the problem of whether National Limited Partnership
interests will be treated as stock of the National Corporation because the national-level
investors have pro-rata interests in the National Corporation and the National Limited
Partnership and because the lion's share of their investment is in the latter organization.
This kind of financing arrangement appears to be a rather transparent attempt to give
the limited partners control of the general partner while preserving single tier taxation
with optimum tax shelter potential. See discussion accompanying notes 151-57 infra.
In an attempt to skirt the distinct possibility that the Commissioner would insist that
all income of the National Limited Partnership be treated as a tax attribute of the Na-
tional Corporation, Tide IX provides that "[t]he interest of a limited partner in the
partnership shall not be treated as a stock interest in the corporation, notwithstanding
that such interest of a limited partner may be proportionate to his stock interest in the
corporation." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3937(g) (1969).
With respect to the state law of partnerships, a pro-rata overlap between ownership
of stock of a corporate general partner and ownership of limited partnership interests,
where all the stock of the general partnership is owned by limited partners, would al-
most surely lead to the conclusion that the limited partners have lost their limited
liability status. The same can be said for any limited partners who are also directors or
officers of the corporate general partner. See discussion accompanying notes 151-54
in!ra. In apparent anticipation of this difficulty, Title IX negates unlimited liability
for corporate limited partners which own no more than 5 percent of the stock of the
National Corporation general partner or whose officers and directors are also officers
and directors of the National Corporation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3937(g) (1969). No such
protection is afforded non-corporate organizations or individuals who are limited part-
ners and at the same time own stock or occupy management positions in the corporate
general partner.
Title IX does not seem to address itself to the possibility that the National Limited
Partnership might be taxed as a corporation. If the National Corporation is deemed
not to have substantial assets other than those in the National Limited Partnership and
if the National Corporation is considered a mere agent (or dummy) for the limited
partners - both of which elements may likely be present - the corporate attribute
of limited liability will attach, provided the limited partners have not lost their limited
liability status. See discussion accompanying notes 51-55 supra. Hence, if the $2.5
million of stock proceeds are not contributed to the partnership, the personal liability
of the corporate general partner will probably be recognized, even though the partner-
ship will be engaged in transactions involving much larger sums. See Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(d)(2) (1965). If however, all the National Corporation's assets are in-
vested in the partnership, the further question of whether the corporate general partner
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the production of low and moderate income housing. It could,
therefore, furnish the remaining $22,750 necessary to produce the
hypothetical million dollar project. Indeed, the National Limited
Partnership may take more than a 25 percent slice of the equity
where its National Corporation general partner decides that the bal-
ance "is not readily obtainable from other responsible [localJ in-
vestors ..."I'
2. Non-profit "Take-Out" Sponsors.- As the holding period
of depreciable property grows longer, the benefits of the tax shelter
grow smaller. While book depreciation and net income remain
constant, amortization payments increase and accelerated tax de-
preciation decelerates. When tax depreciation begins to trail book
depreciation, no net income is sheltered from taxes. Even before
this occurs, however, amortization may begin to exceed tax depre-
ciation so as to remove the tax shelter from distributable fund
flow.
11 7
When the effective return on a rental housing investment is no
longer competitively attractive because of dwindling tax depre-
ciation, it becomes necessary to rotate depreciable assets. The de-
preciated-out property must be sold and new property acquired so
that fast write-offs can be continued. Quite naturally, then, a ready
method of disposing of project property is of particular importance
to the limited distribution sponsor. It is also essential that the
property be sold at the highest possible price, since it -is at the point
is simply the agent of the limited partners becomes critical. In view of the fact that
limited partners will own all or the vast majority of the stock of the general partner
and the further fact that the agents of the limited partners are likely to constitute the
management of the general partner, there is a substantial probability that the Na-
tional Corporation will be classified as a dummy. Since Title IX also negates unlimited
liability for limited partners, even though they exercise control over management of
the partnership, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 3937(g) (1969), chances are great that the Na-
tional Limited Partnership would be deemed to possess the corporate quality of limited
liability. Centralization of management could be avoided if the National Corporation
has a substantial interest in the assets of the partnership. But what is a substantial in-
terest? If the $2.5 million raised by the National Corporation is invested entirely in
the National Limited Partnership, the ratio of its contribution to that of the limited
partners will be 5 percent. This is not enough. See note 50 supra. On the positive
side, if the National Limited Partnership will be dissolved upon the withdrawal of the
National Corporation, continuity of life is missing. Finally, if limited partnership in-
terests cannot be transferred with full rights of substitution without the consent of
other partners, the element of free transferability cannot be established. In sum, the
National Limited Partnership can escape corporate tax treatment, but there will be
little room to spare.
116 Interests in the National Corporation, the National Limited Partnership, and
local partnerships are declared to be legal investments for national bank portfolios. 12
U.S.C.A. § 24 (1969).
117 See note 19 supra.
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of sale that the sponsor must recover its initial equity investment as
well as net income which has gone toward amortization of principal.
Unfortunately, it is not likely that the limited distribution sponsor
will be swamped with attractive purchase offers - the dearth of
buyers being due largely to the fact that full accelerated deprecia-
tion cannot be taken by the second owner of the rental property.
118
Section 236(j) (3) of the National Housing Act" 9 purports to
fill this troublesome hiatus in the tax shelter process. It does so by
making it possible for non-profit sponsors to obtain 100 percent
mortgage financing for the purchase of rental housing from a
limited distribution sponsor. The maximum purchase price is lim-
ited to "appraised value," but this phraseology is further modified by
a provision that "value shall be based upon a mortgage amount on
which the debt service can be met from the income of the property
when operated on a nonprofit basis, after payment of all operating
expenses, taxes, and required reserves. '"120 Unfettered by the re-
quirement for showing a net income, the nonprofit sponsor will
perhaps be able to pay more than a profit oriented purchaser.
Consequently, the limited distribution seller may well recoup not
only its initial equity investment and net income spent on amortiza-
tion but also part of book depreciation as well.
Upon the disposition, a section 1250 gain would be taxed at
ordinary rates.' 2 ' However, section 1250 gain can be generated
118 CoDE § 167(c).
119 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1(j) (3) (1969).
120 Id. The legislative history confirms Congressional intent to supplement the
tax shelter process through nonprofit take-out purchases:
Mortgage insurance would also be available under this section to enable a
cooperative or private nonprofit organization to purchase a project from a
limited-dividend mortgagor. In such a case the Secretary would be author-
ized to insure the purchaser's mortgage in an amount not exceeding the value
of the property at the time of purchase, thereby making it possible for the
cooperative or nonprofit organization to borrow, under a single mortgage, the
funds needed to obtain ownership, while enabling the limited-dividend seller
to realize a net amount out of the sales proceeds in many cases sufficient
to recover its cash, land, and other investment and to retire the outstanding
mortgage. This will be especially useful in connection with the goal of at-
tracting large amounts of private-equity money into the provision of low and
moderate income housing through the establishment of national partnerships
(proposed by title IX of the bill). It will give the limited-dividend mort-
gagor a ready means of disposing of his project, thereby making his invest-
ment more liquid and attractive. S. REP. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
25-26 (1968).
EHA Regulations echo the theme. 34 FED. REG. 1238, amending 24 C.F.R. § 236A0(c)
(1969).
1 2 1 CODE § 1250(a)(1).
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only by depreciation -in excess of straight line'2 2 and is inversely
proportional to the length of the holding period.'23 Upon a dis-
position occuring 120 mounts after acquisition, no depreciation
taken in excess of straight line will be taxed as ordinary income. 24
Gain over and above section 1250 gain will presumably receive
capital treatment.
Of course, if the sale price is equal to or less than net book
value (i.e., if the property value has actually decreased in line with
book depreciation), and if the limited distribution sponsor still has
to pay taxes because accelerated depreciation has been used for tax
purposes, then the shelter of net income in prior years has not been
complete. By using the technique of a nonprofit sponsor take out,
however, it is not inconceivable that the property could be sold at
more than its net book value. Such excess would represent addi-
tional book net income which might be sufficient to offset all taxes
resulting from the disposition. If such were the case, the tax shelter
of income during previous operational periods would truly be com-
plete.
IV. TYPES OF INVESTORS: REFINEMENTS OF
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURE
A. Who Will Invest?
In order to provide the large sums necessary for equity financ-
ing, it will be necessary to obtain investment from outside the com-
munity in which the rental housing is built. The question is: What
sort of outside investor can be drawn to the project?
Presumably, the tax motivations which render untroubled real
estate investment attractive to the ordinary investor will operate
with equal force in the low and moderate income housing field.
The entire philosophy of the National Limited Partnership is pred-
icated on the "tax magic" of accelerated depreciation and finan-
cial leverage.12  Theoretically, then, there should be no great diffi-
culty in attracting outside private capital to the local housing part-
nership.
We have noted that participation by the private investor is a
theoretical consequence of the tax considerations which motivate
any real estate investment. In practice, however, will private capital
1221d. § 1250(b)(1).
123Id. § 1250(a)(2).
124 Id. But see note 108 supra.
125 See text accompanying notes 109-16 supra.
HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS
find the low and moderate income housing project as worthy of its
attention as the expensive luxury high-rise or the downtown office
building? It has been suggested that the depredation rules which
create the real estate tax shelter actually operate so as to discourage
investment in new and rehabilitated low income housing. 2 ' In
general, it is said that, unlike other commodities, housing is highly
durable and that new construction has always been a very small per-
centage of the existing housing inventory. Because of this fact,
existing -housing dominates the market and investors in rental realty
are attracted to, and prefer to invest in, existing apartment property.
The more decrepit and ancient the structure, the shorter is its useful
life and the greater the depreciation deduction available to the in-
vestor. Moreover, although accelerated depreciation is not avail-
able for used housing, the Internal Revenue Service has permitted
depreciation of used housing at 150 percent of the straight line
rate,127 thus narrowing the gap between the depreciation bene-
fits accruing to the investor in new housing and those available to
the investor in used housing. It has been further suggested that
available private capital gravitates toward the glamour investment
such as luxury housing and commercial, office, motel, and shopping
center structures; that monetary policy plays a critical role in the
establishment of interest rates which directly affect loan terms and
financial leverage, thus making tax incentives to investment in
housing overly dependent upon, and subject to, abrupt changes in
monetary policy; 28 and finally, that present depreciation rules favor
a frequent turnover of ownership which militates against proper
maintenance and the exercise of social responsibility which is nec-
essary in the low and moderate income housing field.
These are serious drawbacks to attracting private capital to low
and moderate income housing. It may be, however, that their dis-
couraging effects have been given more weight than is merited.
We have seen in recent years a willingness on the part of investors
to engage in the tax shelter game with respect to senior citizens
housing developments of all kinds and varieties. Granted, they
tend to favor developments for the relatively financially secure sen-
ior citizen, but a very considerable portion of the total investment
in golden age housing is in the moderate income category and con-
128 See, e.g., Sporn, Some Contributions of the Income Tax Law to the Growth
and Prevalence of Slums, 59 CoLuvL L REv. 1026 (1959).
12 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-0(b) (1956); Special Ruling, August 30, 1946, re-
printed in 4 CCII 1946 STAND FED. TAX REP. S 6273. But see note 108 supra.
128 Sporn, supra note 126.
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sists of new apartment construction which developers have been
able to transfer to investment syndicates. There is no reason to
believe that, given the added mortgage protection afforded by the
National Housing Act,1 29 private investment capital cannot be
drawn to the local housing partnership at least as readily as it is
now increasingly being drawn to the moderate income senior citizens
project.
It is probably true that, even with mortgage insurance and sub-
sidies to mortgagees, it will be difficult to entice private capital into
the rehabilitation of existing low and moderate income housing.
However, the local partnerships will be engaged in new construc-
tion as well as in rehabilitation, so the accelerated depreciation ele-
ment of the tax shelter will certainly be available as to the new
housing. Second, those who argue that present depreciation rules
(particularly the availability since 1946 of 150 percent of the
straight line rate) 'have put existing housing approximately on a
par with new housing in capacity to attract investors, have actually
produced an argument which favors the use of tax incentives in the
rehabilitation field. If what they say is true (and they admit that
quantitative measurement of any significance is impossible in this
area),'30 then the local housing partnership should be able to at-
tract investors who will benefit both from new and rehabilitated
low cost housing by way of the tax shelter. Finally, the current
vogue in glamour real estate investment is not solely the result of
obvious economic benefit 'based on the tax shelter. It is also the
product of sophisticated marketing and well directed propaganda.
An aggressive, able local partnership offering the same tax stimuli,
can also engage in the marketing of its investment offerings so as
to compete respectably with the glamour investment opportunity in
real estate.
Private investors, however, do not constitute the only source of
non-mortgage financing. Very recently, the tax exempt foundations
have become an important source of financial support for housing
programs. 31 By investing a portion of its principal in a local hous-
ing partnership, a foundation may participate directly in the creation
or rehabilitation of low and moderate income housing. Here, of
course, tax incentives are of no significance and the arguments
129 See note 10 supra.
130 Remarks of Stanley S. Surrey, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, de-
livered before the Fifth Annual Development Forum, Urban America, Inc., Oct. 28,
1968, at Berkeley, California.
131 FORD FOUNDATION, NEw OPTIONS IN THE PHILANTHROPIC PROCESS (1968).
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which apply to private investors have no relation to the motivation
of the tax exempt organization.
Tax savings will be relatively insignificant to yet another po-
tential class of investors - the residents of the community in which
the housing is built or rehabilitated. In some areas of our cities, it
would probably be a social impossibility for "outside" investors to
organize a profit-making housing project without giving citizens of
the surrounding area an opportunity to share in the profits.8 2 To
be sure, no vast sums of money will be raised from this source,
but there may be a number of neighborhood residents with both
the means and the motive to invest small amounts in a community
endeavor. In any event, there may be a practical imperative to fur-
nish the opportunity for neighborhood financial involvement.
B. Capital Structure.
Since it appears that tax incentives can attract outside investors
to the low and moderate income housing field and that tax exempt
foundations as well as low tax bracket community residents can
also be reasonably expected to participate, the question is: Given
the available investment vehicles, how can the interests of outside
investors, foundations, and community participants be integrated
into a business form so as to achieve the ends that each group is
seeking? The choice of organizational form and capital structure
is limited by tax considerations and the provisions of the National
Housing Act applicable to limited distribution sponsors. Prior anal-
ysis has led to the inexorable conclusion that the limited partner-
ship form should be used to maximize tax benefits for high bracket
outside investors.88 Can the investment goals of tax exempt foun-
dations and low-bracket investors be accommodated within the
framework of a limited partnership?
For the outside investor, the goal is clear: tax shelter by virtue
of depreciation and financial leverage. He is not -interested in
moderate net income return except as that return is swollen -by the
fact that it is tax free. He is even more satisfied when he has a
net operating loss to offset against other income. The charitable
foundation is not at all interested in tax shelter since it is not a tax-
payer anyway. It is, however, interested in a reasonable income
132 It is too widely known to require citation that the Nixon administration has
consistently favored the concept of giving minority groups "a piece of the action." Hous-
ing for profit can certainly be classified as action. Who but the community in which it
is located has a better right to a piece of it?
133 See text accompanying notes 16-84 supra.
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yield (preferably distributable) from its investment. Similarly, the
community resident would be more impressed by the rate of return
than by its tax free character or the availability of deduction pass-
throughs to shelter his other income.
Obviously, an optimum accommodation of these interests could
be achieved if it were possible to separate out the tax attributes of
income on the one hand and depreciation (and other deductions)
on the other, so that income could be allocated at a fixed high-rate
level (say, 7 percent of investment) to the exempt and low-bracket
investors, while the remainder of the income plus all depreciation
and other deductions could be allocated to the high-bracket inves-
tors. This would, in effect, give the exempt and low-bracket inves-
tors a preferred status as to income, while giving the high-bracket
investor the rest of the income and the full benefit of all the partner-
ship's depreciation and other deductions.
Within a partnership framework, the Internal Revenue Code
does make possible some such accommodation of divergent partner-
ship interests. Section 704(a) provides: "A partner's distributive
share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall, except as
otherwise provided in this section, be determined by the partner-
ship agreement." Thus, under the Code, it 'is possible to alter the
usual distribution of tax attributes by an agreement between the
partners. Presumably, items of depreciation or other deductions,
such as business expenses and interest, could be allocated by agree-
ment to the high-bracket investors, while items of income could be
divided in such a way as to give the preferred investors a fixed re-
turn on their investment, with the residue going to the nonpreferred
limited partners.
However, the procedure is not as simple as it appears. The
Regulations have imposed a limitation upon such shifting of tax
attributes by providing that any agreement calling for such shifting
may be disregarded if its "principal purpose" is to avoid or evade
federal income taxes.' Whether the principal purpose of such
an agreement is evasion or avoidance of federal income tax turns
upon a variety of considerations, including whether there is a busi-
ness purpose for the allocation and whether it has "substantial eco-
nomic effect" in that it actually affects the dollar amounts of the
partners' shares of partnership income or loss independently of tax
consequences.' 5 It seems that deflection of items of deduction
134Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956).
135 d.
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from exempt and low-bracket partners to high-bracket partners,
in the absence of compelling business reasons and without any re-
lation of such deductions to an actual burden or loss borne by the
high-bracket investors, is an avoidance of federal -income tax. In
the case of the housing partnership, the Commissioner could argue
that the principal purpose of allocation is the enhancement of the
tax shelter possibilities for the high-bracket investor. If this posi-
tion prevailed, allocation of items of deduction by agreement may
simply have to be abandoned as between limited partners whose
economic positions in the partnership differ only in terms of gen-
eral status (high-bracket versus exempt and low-bracket) for fed-
eral income tax purposes. 3 ' Nevertheless, an argument could be
made that the 'high-bracket investor is, in effect, a "junior" interest-
holder who bears the highest risk of operational losses for partner-
ship law purposes and that, as such, he should be permitted to take
all of the tax depreciation. In other words, such allocation of depre-
ciation does have substantial economic effect.'37  The argument
would be especially cogent if the preferred limited partner's right
to a fixed return on his investment were cumulative and if he had
a liquidation preference in the amount of his original investment
plus accrued arrearages. While there is merit in these contentions,
they are more than somewhat palled by the countervailing assertion
that no such allocation would be made but for the tax status of the
two types of investors. Thus, there is considerable uncertainty in
the tax technique of constituting exempt and low-bracket investors
a preferred group as to a fixed amount of income and the high-
bracket investors a common group as to the remaining income and
all deductions.
An alternative would be to sell unsecured partnership debt to
exempt and low-bracket investors. The debt would be long term
and would probably have to be subordinated to the FHA insured
mortgage. This method of funding would remove the tax pitfalls
which surround the allocation of tax attributes among preferred
and junior limited partners, since creditors of the partnership do not
share its tax attributes. Furthermore, the presence of additional
debt would increase the basis of the general partners' interests, 3
and, because it represents an additional tax deduction, would en-
-36 Id., Example (3).
'37 d.
13sSee text accompanying notes 65-74 supra.
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hance the tax shelter for the remaining partners, both limited and
general.
Of course, the presence of debt in the financial structure does
require the partnership to meet the interest expense on a regular
basis, whereas a preferred limited partner's share of book net in-
come could be credited to his capital account even though it is being
used for partnership purposes.
C. Distributional Problems.
A limited partnership composed of a small group of moneyed
investors would probably have a clear path to private offering ex-
emptions from registration under federal and state securities laws." 9
The same can be said for preferred partnership interests or debt
sold to a few tax exempt foundations. But what of the securities
offered and sold to members of the community? It is difficult to
see how registration could be avoided.140  However, the "small
offering" exemption' 4 1 would afford some relief from the full ex-
penses of federal registration in most cases. SEC Regulation A sets
out the regimen for abbreviated registration of an offering of
$300,000 or less in any one year. 2
Apart from the securities problems involved in selling partner-
ship interests or debt to neighborhood residents, the mechanics of
distribution may raise some significant practical problems. If pre-
139 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(2) (1964); UNIFORM SECURI-
TIES AcT § 402. Some have suggested that limited partnership interests in a partner-
ship formed pursuant to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act might not even be securi-
ties. See 1 L Loss, SEcuRiriEs REGULATION 504-05 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969). But
see Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful For-
mula?, 18 W. RES. L REV. 367, 407-11 (1967). Caution must be exercised when
playing the numbers game in connection with the federal private offering exemption.
First of all, if number is meaningful in determining the coverage of the exemption, it is
the number of offerees that matters - not the number of eventual investors. Second,
the number of offerees, no matter how small, may never conclusively establish the ex-
emption. See In re D. F. Bernheimer & Co., 41 S.E.C. 358 (1963).
If the limited partnership interests are deemed to be securities, then they are subject
to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws, notwithstanding their exemption from
registration.
140 Perhaps federal registration could be avoided by seeking the so-called intrastate
exemption. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1964) . How-
ever, this is a rather slippery provision, and great care would have to be exerdsed to make
sure that all the resident investors were domiciled in the state where the partnership does
business and that all the purchasers took with an investment intent. For a short but in-
formative analysis of section 3(a)(11) pitfalls, see Sowards, The Intrastate Exemption,
2 REV. SEc. REGULATION 922 (1969).
141 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1964).
142 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (1968). A further reduction in the level of com-
pliance is available for offerings not in excess of $50,000. Id. at § 230.257.
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ferred limited partnership interests are used, the limitations of the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act as well as the Internal Revenue
Code must be dealt with.
The first hurdle is raised 'by the state law requirement that,
whenever a new partner is added, the partnership certificate be
amended and signed 'by all the members, including the new mem-
ber. 43 This sort of limitation certainly puts a gaff in a prolonged
distributional process where the offering is disposed of piecemeal
by mail or face-to-face solicitation. The necessity for obtaining the
signatures of existing partners every time a new partner is accepted
might be obviated by constituting one of the partners attorney-in-
fact to sign certificate amendments. 14 4 But the sheer frequency of
amendments might be so discommoding as to render the selling
process impractical. One method of reducing the inconvenience of
continual amending would be to "batch" prospective investors and
have them all sign a single amendment when a sufficiently large
group of prospects has been formed.
Selecting long-term debt as the vehicle for resident participa-
tion would also remove the distributional obstacles posed by partner-
ship law, because the addition of creditors requires no change in the
partnership certificate.
A related problem - though it deals with the period after dis-
tribution - is whether partnership interests sold to low-bracket
investors should or can be made freely transferable. Prior discus-
sion has indicated that making partnership interests transferable
bolsters the Commissioner's argument for taxing the organization as
a corporation.145 But even if the tax risk could be taken, sections
24(2) (b) and 25(1) (b) of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
might hinder the attainment of easy transferability. Although the
partnership certificate may give limited partners the right to sub-
stitute their assignees as members of the partnership,146 substitu-
tion still requires amendment of the certificate and signing by all
old and new partners.4 7 Thus, in planning for transferability,
some of the same problems raised in the distributional context
143UL.P.A. §§ 24(2)(c), 25(1)(b).
144 Quaere, however, whether an attorney-in-fact can meet the "sworn to" require-
ment of U.L.P.A. § 25 (1) (b).
145 See text following note 55 supra.
146 U.L.P.A. § 19(4).
47 Id. §§ 24(2)(b), 25(1)(b).
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will be met.1 48  Again, if long term unsecured debt is used, part-
nership law will not be a hindrance to transfer.
D. Control of the Project.
Among the other social implications of establishing a profit-
motivated housing partnership in the inner city is the rather strong
likelihood that the neighborhood residents will seek a substantial
voice in its management. The representation sought would be for
the community as a whole and not just for residents who have pur-
chased debt or limited partnership interests. At the same time, the
outside investors who are furnishing the bulk of the capital will no
doubt wish to maintain the greatest possible representation in man-
agement consistent with their limited partnership position and
countervailing community pressures. 4 '
Clearly, limited partners and debtholders, as such, cannot take
part in management. Moreover, it is unlikely that the neighbor-
hood affected can produce individuals willing to take on general
partnership responsibilities. A solution to the problem might lie in
having a business corporation general partner and dividing its vot-
ing stock among the outside investors and the neighborhood resi-
dents according to a satisfactory ratio. This suggestion raises a num-
ber of serious issues.
To begin with, in order to avoid the corporate attribute of cer-
tralized management for tax purposes, the general partner must
have substantial assets invested in the partnership.' To meet this
requirement, the proceeds from the sale of corporate stock would
have to be more than could possibly be raised from the commu-
nity, and yet the neighborhood may wish to own a considerable
block of voting shares. The largest part of the corporate general
partner's assets would have to come from the outside investor group.
While the problem of selling voting shares to different groups at
different prices could be solved by devising a corporate equity struc-
ture composed of voting preferred and voting common, the fact
remains that the outside investors are interested primarily in the
optimum tax shelter potential connected with limited partnership
14 8 See text accompanying notes 143-44 supra.
149 Were there no need for community voice in management, the general partner
would probably be a person (or group) whose interests were more or less identified with
those of the limited partners, although care would be exercised to avoid any direct or in-
direct relationships of control between the two types of investors. In other words, the
general and limited partners would be like-minded if not alike in law.
150 See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
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interests, and they will not be willing to -invest substantial sums
in the corporate general partner.
Perhaps the goal of creating substantial assets in the corporate
general partner should not be given too high a priority, because the
only tax consequence of the corporation's being too "poor" is that
the partnership will be deemed to have centralized management.
Even if this should occur, the partnership could still escape the other
three attributes of limited liability, continuity of life, and free trans-
ferability of interest. With this in mind, it might be concluded
that a business corporation general partner, whose stock is sold at a
nominal price to the community and to outside investors, would
provide an excellent vehicle for control allocation. Unfortunately,
there are other complications.
The use of a business corporation as the general partner in a
housing limited partnership raises a number of problems which
have heretofore been mentioned only -in passing. These problems
arise where individual limited partners in a limited partnership are
either stockholders, directors, or officers of the corporation which
is the general partner. The problems arise from the basic notion
that limited partners enjoy their statutory freedom from liability
for partnership obligations only so long as they do not take part
in the control of the affairs and business of the partnership.151 The
question of when a limited partner has taken part in the control of
the business creates an interpretative problem which has greatly
troubled the commentators, but it has produced very little litiga-
tion. 5 If the question of control is troublesome when it concerns
only an individual limited partner who involves himself in man-
agement, it is doubly so when that limited partner has a concurrent
financial interest as a stockholder in the corporate general partner
whose board of directors dearly controls the affairs of the partner-
ship. Similar difficulties are encountered where the limited partner
does not have an interest in the corporate general partner but does
occupy a managerial position therein, that is, as a director or major
officer. The question in such cases is whether the occupancy of
such dual positions violates the control test of section 7 of the Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act so as to render the individual limited
partner liable as a general partner in respect of partnership obliga-
tions.
151U.LP.A. § 7.
152 See Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1470
(1969).
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The two situations in which the control test is most clearly vio-
lated are (1) where the limited partner (or several of them) owns
or controls a majority of the voting stock of the corporate general
partner, and (2) where the limited partner (or several of them)
is a director or officer of the corporate general partner. In both,
the limited partner is clearly in a position to manage the affairs of
the partnership by virtue of his management of the corporate gen-
eral partner. In the case of the limited-partner director, such con-
trol is inevitable, since the director is responsible for all major cor-
porate policy decisions, including decisions concerning the manage-
ment of the partnership. While majority shareholders are further
removed from the decisional process, they nevertheless control the
composition of the board of directors and, therefore, should logically
be treated in the same manner as a director for purposes of the con-
trol test. This is particularly true where the interests of the partners
in the partnership and in the corporation are proportional. How-
ever, even where the interests in the two entities are not proportional,
so long as the limited-partner shareholders hold a majority of stock
in the corporate general partner, they do ultimately control its des-
tiny and through it the destiny of the partnership. Thus, they are
indirectly involved in control of the partnership.
Where the limited-partner shareholders hold less than majority
of the corporate general partner's voting stock, it might be argued
that they ought not be treated as participating to any significant ex-
tent in the control of the partnership business, regardless of whether
their relative interests in the two entities are proportional or merely
random. In either case, they have only a minority interest in the gen-
eral partner and are unable to dominate its affairs. But if the limi-
ted-partner minority shareholders have a right to elect directors of
the corporate general partner, the argument against their unlimited
liability weakens considerably. After all, their directors will partic-
ipate in management, and personal liability results if the limited
partner "takes part" in control. 153
A limited partner who is also an officer of the corporate general
partner (and is not a stockholder or director) would appear to be di-
rectly involved in control of the partnership. However, since cor-
porate officers are generally elected by, and serve at the pleasure of,
the board of directors and are subject to its control and supervision,
the dual position of limited-partner officers might not violate the
control requirement.
15 3 U.L.P.A. § 7.
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The fact that the issues herein have not been specifically litigated
should not lull planners into a belief that there is no danger lurking
in these "concurrent interest" situations.154 Nor do all the possible
surprises lie in the area of partnership law. While a determination
that limited partners have lost their limited liability status will not
lead to the partnership's being taxed as a corporation, 15 if the share-
holders of the corporate general partner hold proportionate interests
as limited partners, the two entities are obviously "owned or con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the same interests" as that phrase is
used in section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. Where such a rela-
tionship exists, section 482 allows the Commissioner to "distribute,
apportion or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances
between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses," in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
such related entities. It does not seem entirely beyond the realm of
15 4 The unexpected and unwelcome results of similar dual interests are well illustra-
ted in Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F. Supp. 150 (1958), aff'd in
part, 265 F.2d 227 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959). In that case, several
of the individual defendants formed a limited partnership under the Utah Limited Part-
nership Act. They caused the partnership to organize a mutual benefit insurance com-
pany which was later reorganized as a stock company. When the stock of the insurance
company was publicly sold, the limited partners, who were also directors, shareholders,
and officers of the company, failed to disclose the fact that they had caused the corpora-
tion to enter into an agreement with the partnership which required the corporation to
pay certain sums to the partnership in respect of an alleged transfer of property to the
corporation and for the payment of commissions on insurance sales. The corporation
later issued stock to the limited partners in satisfaction of its alleged liabilities under the
contract and for a release of the agreement. A derivative stockholder's suit was filed
against the limited partners, who, as directors, had allegedly caused the stock to be issued
to themselves without any consideration therefore. One of the defenses raised by the
director-parmers was that, as limited partners, they were not subject to personal liability
in respect of the dealings between the partnership and the corporation. The court re-
jected the defense on the ground that the only business of the partnership was the for-
mation and operation of the insurance company; that by virtue of their positions as direc-
tors and shareholders of the corporation, they engaged in the active conduct of the
partnerships affairs; and, therefore, that they could not rely on the limited liability of-
fered by the limited partnership form, since they had disregarded its spirit. 170 F.
Supp. at 159. On appeal, this particular issue received no attention, since it was deter-
mined that the partnership had not formally complied with the requirements of the Utah
Limited Partnership Act and, because of its defective organization, it was a general and
not a limited partnership. 265 F.2d at 235. This defect had also been noted in the
trial court's opinion, but it had gone on to state that even if the partnership had been
validly organized, the dual positions occupied by the director-partners would have been
a violation of the control provision of the Act. 170 F. Supp. at 159. Thus, while the
issue was not determined on appeal, the statement of the trial court furnishes ample
evidence of the danger involved in an arrangement in which limited partners are also
directors or shareholders of a corporate general partner. In Bergeson, the corporation
was not a member of the partnership at all, and yet the trial court found a violation of
the control prohibition. Where the corporation is a general partner, the argument that
violation of the prohibition has taken place is even more cogent.
15 5 See discussion accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
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possibility that the Commissioner may take the position that the inter-
ests of the limited partners as such are not separate and distinct from
their interests in the corporation; that such interests, in fact, represent
equity interests in the corporate general partner; and, finally, that
under section 482 the income and deductions of the limited partners
should be reallocated to the corporation in order to properly reflect
true income picture as between the corporate general partner and the
limited partners. This result, if judicially sustained, would destroy
the optimum -tax shelter effects of the limited partnership for local
investors. Worse yet, if the National Limited Partnership were to
be a partner in the local partnership,' 56 the entire fabric of tax incen-
tives, which so carefully seeks to protect income and depreciation
pass-through up the line from the local project to the national-level
investors, would be torn, and the whole idea would be defeated.
Since only the National Limited Partnership would be immune
from section 482 reallocation, 57 the idea of the local partnership
feeding tax attributes to the limited partners of the National Limited
Partnership would be meaningless. This danger, like the control
prohibition, is inherent in the present structure of the law, and its
ramifications have obviously not been considered.
From the foregoing, the prospects appear dim for successfully
using a business corporate general partner as a device for representing
both the community and outside investors in project management.
On the tax side, the arrangement might successfully ward off the re-
allocation of income attack, especially if area residents invest in a
large portion of the corporation's stock but do not own limited part-
nership interests. But the outside investor group, having the largest
financial stake as limited partners, would demand, at the very least,
sufficient voting power to elect a minority of the corporation's direc-
tors. In doing so, they might well forfeit their insulation against
creditors' claims.
While the business corporation does not appear to be the most
desirable means of accommodating the control demands of outside
investors and area residents, perhaps the nonprofit, community-based
corporation, cast in the role of general partner, offers a reasonable
solution. The governing boards of non-profit neighborhood organ-
izations are very often composed of a mix of responsible residents
from the immediate area as well as citizens from the larger commun-
156 See discussion accompanying notes 109-16 supra.
157 See note 115 supra.
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ity representing churches, city government, the professions, and as-
sorted sectors of industry.
Within a group such as this, both outside investors and neighbor-
hood residents ought to find adequate representation for their re-
spective views and special interests. On the one hand, the limited
partners, who are furnishing the major financial backing, could very
likely be satisfied that there are enough "kindred financial spirits" in
the organization to insure proper management and investment pro-
tection. On the other hand, the residents might be content in the
knowledge that those who intimately know and understand their
problems will have policy-making power.
It is true that the suggestion of a nonprofit corporate general
partner presents a rather loose and unstructured solution to the ques-
tion of diverse representation. Nor is it denied that a good deal of
informal give and take might be necessary to reach mutually agree-
able guidelines for the composition of the nonprofit corporation's
management. But this "play in the joints" may be what most rec-
ommends the concept. More importantly, the nonprofit general
partner seems to go a long way toward solving the partnership and
tax questions already discussed. Because a nonprofit corporation has
no stock or financial interests that can be owned by the limited part-
ners, the Commissioner would be hard pressed to achieve corporate
tax treatment by recasting and reallocation. The absence of voting
stock also means that the limited partners will not have direct and
specific legal power to select management of the general partner,
thus reducing the chance that the veil of limited liability will be
rent. Finally, though the nonprofit general partner might invest
only a nominal sum in the partnership, corporate tax treatment can
be avoided because centralization of management is the only corpor-
ate attribute which can be established.
V. CONCLUSION
By enacting the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968,158 Congress has explicitly adopted the policy of using tax in-
centives to induce private investment capital to perform a vital na-
tional function - the rehabilitation and construction of law and
moderate income housing. Title IX of the 1968 Act declares:
The Congress finds that the volume of housing being produced for
families and individuals of low or moderate income must be in-
creased to meet the national goal of a decent home and a suitable
158 82 Stat. 476, printed in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 547.
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living environment for every American family, and declares that it
is the policy of the United States to encourage the widest possible
participation by private enterprise in the provision of housing for
low or moderate income families. The Congress has therefore de-
termined that one or more private organizations should be created
to encourage maximum participation by private investors in pro-
grams and projects to provide low and moderate income housing. 10°
Tax shelters have, for some time, been the progeny of accel-
erated depreciation and financial leverage. To stimulate production
of rental housing, Congress has, over the years, added to the tax
shelter an array of other subsidies which permit investors to under-
take high cost projects with minimal cash commitments and to en-
joy very substantial after tax yields while doing so. With the advent
of the 1968 Act, however, it becomes crystal clear that Congress in-
tends the use of partnerships, FHA financing, and accelerated de-
preciation tax shelters - in combination - to produce low and mod-
erate income housing.
Exclusions, preferences and concessions of all kinds have been,
for better or for worse, a distinctive feature of our income tax law
since its inception. In general, these departures from strict tax neu-
trality have resulted from the interplay of political and economic
forces in the Congressional arena, and not from specific, deliberate
governmental intervention aimed at accomplishing some basic pur-
pose or policy. In the case of low and moderate income housing,
however, Congress has employed an amalgam of tax incentive and
subsidy to woo private investors. This deliberate and contrived use
of the tax laws by Congress to further a national policy is a remark-
able departure from the usual manner in which tax preferences de-
velop.
While the wisdom of permitting any special preferences,
whether they be inspired by special interest pressure or government
policy, is now a matter of considerable debate,160 the fact is that the
Congress has chosen the tax incentive path in the housing field.
The question is: Will it have the desired effect of rallying private
enterprise in support of Congressional policy?
We have shown in the foregoing analysis that, theoretically, the
tax and subsidy package should be attractive to the potential investor
in real estate. Economic conservatives, who might usually be ex-
pected to look askance at government incursion into the housing
159 42 U.S.C.A. § 3931 (1968).
160 See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARv. L. REv. 925 (1967).
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field, apparently support such intrusion when it consists of tax in-
centives designed to get private enterprise to do the job. Those who
oppose the use of tax inducements cannot quarrel with the National
Housing Act on the ground that it creates new and insupportable tax
preferences; on the contrary, it merely employs those that are al-
ready part and parcel of the tax laws, albeit in a new and more at-
tractive package.
The results are, in fact, beginning to come in. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp. has announced that it proposes to form subsidiaries to
sponsor moderate income housing projects under the National Hous-
ing Act. 6 ' The Savings Bank Association of New York State is
soliciting major industrial and utility corporations to sponsor its
projects under the National Housing Act.16' Michigan Consolidated
Gas Co. has obtained SEC permission to capitalize a non-utility sub-
sidiary to produce low and moderate income housing using the tax
shelter. 163
The inducement has been provided, and, were it not for some
very puzzling action taken by the House of Representatives in the
pending Tax Reform Act of 1969,1" it could be expected that pri-
vate capital would respond. The House reform package, as of this
printing, would excise from current tax law several critical com-
ponents of the total incentive mechanism. Chief among these are
the revamping of Code section 1250 so as to achieve 100 percent
recapture of excess depreciation without regard to the holding
period, the elimination of 150 percent declining balance depreciation
for used property, and the general limitation on "preference" de-
ductions, including accelerated depreciation.1 5 Is the Congressional
memory so short that it cannot recall the explicit legislative charge
- handed down only a year ago - urging private investors to seek
shelters from taxes in order to produce and improve shelters for
161 See Wall Street J., Feb. 4, 1969, at 16, col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
162 See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1969, at 63, col. 1.
163 InreMichigan Consol. Gas. Co., SEC Pub. Util. Holding Co. Act Release No.
16331, March 31, 1969, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 77,710:
There is no need to give [the Public Utility Holding Company Act) an
inflexible, static historical reading. Companies subject to it are now presented
with the Congressionally recognized urban problems of the 1960's and 1970's
that could not have been contemplated by the original enacters. The desira-
bility of private capital becoming involved in the rebuilding of our cities
is widely recognized and urged, and the posture today of the utility industry
is substantially changed, at least in terms of weaknesses at which the Holding
Company Act was directed. Equally relevant, there has been evolving since the
1930's a broader motion of corporate responsibility to the community.
6 4 See note 108 supra.
165 Id.
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 723
people. 6 To be sure, the suggested reforms might tend to halt the
abuses perpetrated by slumlords who batten on real estate exploita-
tion outside the framework of FHA control and supervision. But
the evils noted by the Ways and Means Committee simply do not
obtain in the realm of FHA insured housing projects. If an old
building is purchased with a federally-backed purchase money mort-
gage, the property will be rehabilitated and operated in accordance
with rather strict administrative rules. This sort of activity is a far
cry from the typical "used property rotation" practiced by those who
purchase real estate simply to get the 150 percent declining balance
depreciation, without taking any steps toward renovation. Why then
should the 150 percent privilege be revoked as to the salutary en-
deavors of those who submit to FHA scrutiny?
With respect to new construction, it is said that the incentives
offered by the gradual reduction of accelerated depreciation in Code
section 1250 have not produced an influx of private capital into the
low and moderate income housing field.'67 With all due deference,
it is submitted that one year is hardly a sufficient probation period
to test the effectiveness of a Congressional policy, especially since
HUD has not published any comprehensive guidebooks for limited
distribution sponsors. More important, even if it be true that pri-
vate capital has continued to ignore low-cost housing ventures, the
remedy should be designed to further encourage diversion of funds
to such projects. Instead of removing the section 1250 sliding scale
for all real estate, it should be deleted for all but low and moderate
income housing, making it more profitable for private investors to
move into this neglected area.
Finally, it is suggested that the present tax law discourages long
range "stewardship."168 In non-FHA projects, perhaps so. But it has
already been noted that FHA supervision eliminates this problem
during a limited distribution sponsor's stewardship. More critically,
however, the National Housing Act calls for disposition of the
property by the profit-motivated sponsor to a non-profit sponsor or
cooperative which will continue to operate the property indefinitely
under FHA control.16 9
The Congressional vacillation exhibited in H.R. 13720 can only
discourage planning by those who have been dunned to become in-
166 See notes 13 and 120 supra.
167 H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1969).
168 Id.
169 See pp. 758-69 supra.
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volved in low-cost housing. For who is likely to rush in ahead of
inhibited angles when legislative policy appears to be so evanescent
- if not downright meretricious? 'If the tax reform bill survives in
its present form, the issue of private investment in low and moder-
ate income housing will be flung back in the teeth of Congress and
a threnody will be intoned for the hope of massive capital infusion
by nongovernment sources. More tragic still, a new nadir will be
reached in the relationship between the ill-housed and their govern-
ment. One can only hope that the tax reform compass has not yet
been boxed.
